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page 75>line 9 s should read: "of land for public use and of land for improvement
for disposal are already"
SYNOPSIS
From an analysis of the financial arrangements of the Community 
Land Act, this dissertation proposes an alternative framework for a 
local authority land scheme. The Community Land Act, which enabled 
local authorities to take development land into public ownership in 
order to ensure that its development was in the best interests of 
"the community", was passed by a Labour Government in 1975 and 
vigorously opposed throughout its existence by the Conservative 
Party. Chapter 1 outlines the political controversy that surrounded 
the Act's operation. Its dismantling and imminent repeal by the new 
Conservative Government comes as no surprise; but the Government 
stresses that this is on the grounds of its impracticality and not 
of political opposition. The retention of a high level of Development 
Land Tax (introduced a year later than the Community Land Act and 
designed to return a proportion of increases in land values to the 
community), and of the Land Authority for Wales (an executive body 
set up to implement the Land Act in the Principality), together with 
the establishment of Urban Development Corporations (redevelopment 
bodies to be equipped with broad powers of land acquisition and 
management), seem to indicate that the Conservative I&rty is not 
opposed in principle to public ownership of development land or at 
least a part of development value. The Government cites the Community 
Land Act's poor financial performance with respect to the amount of 
land it provided for development as the reason for its unacceptability.
Thus perhaps a practical land scheme would enjoy acceptability 
and, unlike the Central Land Board of 19^7 and the Land Commission of 
1967, whose histories are outlined in chapter 2, would survive the
short terms of party political power. This is felt to be particularly 
important to Planning as access to the ownership rights over develop­
ment land gives the Planner the opportunity to see his proposals 
implemented in a positive way rather than negatively through existing 
development control mechanisms.
The criteria for practicality and acceptability of a local 
authority land scheme are thought to be administrative efficiency and 
effectiveness of implementation and it is believed that both can be 
fulfilled through the provision of an adequate financial framework.
The financial discipline introduced by the Community Land Act is 
classified in chapter 3 and examined in terms of three "Key Areas".
The first of these deals with the administration of Central Government 
loan sanctions for the commencement of programmes; the second, with 
the operation of the Community Land Accounts for the continuation of 
programmes; and the third, with the division of surpluses and financing 
of deficits on the completion of programmes. For their analysis in 
chapter 4 according to the experience of six local authorities in a 
variety of circumstances, another "Key Area"; of land dealing practices 
before and during the operation of the Community Land Act; is added.
The study is carried out principally by means of Questionnaire survey 
of Council Financial Officials.
On the basis of the analysis, conclusions are drawn in chapter 5 
as to the suitability of the Land Act's financial arrangements to 
local authority land dealing, and recommendations are made in 
chapter 6 for the efficient administration and effective implementation 
of a future land scheme. If the financial framework of any such scheme
is sound, it is thought that survival at the least will be assured 
and the Planning Profession will be given the opportunity of a 
fair trial in that which may have been its intended form of 
operation.
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INTRODUCTION : THE COMMUNITY LAND SCHEME
In i960, a property developer bought a plot of agricultural 
land on an urban periphery for £100,000. He held it vacant until 
1970, by which time the town had expanded to encircle the plot of 
land. Its value on the market as a prime site for office develop­
ment had increased tenfold to £1 million. The developer applied 
for planning permission to build an office block on the land; it 
was granted by a local authority anxious to provide more jobs for 
its ratepayers. By holding his land undeveloped for ten years while 
economic growth generated by the town had caused it to expand, the 
developer had made an unrealised profit of £900,000. He built the 
office block and held it vacant while land and property prices 
continued to increase. By having premises ready for rent when the 
price was right, he held a valuable collateral which he used to 
borrow more money for further land deals.
He used £500,000 of this money to buy another plot of 
agricultural land on the new urban periphery. By 1979» the town 
had again expanded to make it a prime site for office development; 
its market value had increased to £1,500,000. He again applied for 
planning permission to build an office block; however, under the 
Community Land Act, the local authority served a Compulsory Purchase 
Order on the land and bought it at its market price. The developer 
had thus realised a profit of £1 million; but 80 per cent of this 
was returned, not to the Treasury but to the authority, in 
Development Land Tax. ttius the developer's profit was reduced 
to £200,000. The authority offered the land, with planning permission 
for office development, back to him on a 99-year lease with 10-year
rent reviews. Written into the lease was a specification that 
the office block must be offered for rent immediately it was 
completed. The authority also issued a development brief which 
stated that the site must be landscaped and that the block must 
be no more than fifteen storeys high.
The developer would have preferred to own the land freehold 
and develop it the way he chose; freehold ownership would also 
give him a stronger collateral for obtaining loans. He had heard 
that the Community Land Act may soon be repealed, so he delayed his 
decision on the authority's offer. After the change of Government 
in May 1979 and the initiation of repeal procedures, he made the 
authority an offer for the freehold of the land.
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CHAFFER 1
THE POLITICAL CONTEXT
On May 21st, 1979* the new Conservative Government took the 
first steps towards honouring a long-made pledge by issuing a 
Guidance Note to Local Authorities which contained two instructions. 
The first of these was to bring further expenditure under the 
Community Land Scheme to a halt "as quickly as possible". The 
second was to free Local Authorities from the restrictions on the 
disposal of land imposed under Section 123A of the Local Government 
Act of 1972, which, as amended by the Community Land Act of 1975* 
required that the permission of the Secretary of State be obtained 
before any disposal. It was made clear that this action was to be 
taken pending the repeal of the Community Land Act in the soon-to-be 
passed Local Government, Planning and Land Bill. It was hardly 
unexpected: in its election manifesto, the Conservative Party had 
announced its intention to
"scrap expensive Socialist programmes such as the 
nationalisation of building land.”
(Milne and Stevens, 1979)
Even more specifically, speaking in his Henley constituency 
on April 23rd, 1979» the future Secretary of State for the 
Environment, Michael Heseltine, stated that on accession his party 
would
"abolish the Community Land Act and its many controls."
(Milne and Stevens, 1979)
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Previous months had heard the Act variously condemned by 
Conservative Members of Parliament as "an expensive and bureaucratic 
flop" (Michael Latham), "one of the most obvious failures of the 
present (Labour) administration" (Nick Budgen), "the most ghastly 
bureaucratic and economic failure that any government could 
possibly perpetrate" (Hugh Rossi), and "the greatest non-event of 
the decade" (Hugh Rossi again). (Hansard 1979). The only surprise 
was that the new Conservative Government had given such an urgent 
priority to scrapping the Community Land Act in the face of pleas 
for careful consideration of its possibilities by professional 
bodies like the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors and the 
Royal Town Planning Institute.
"Although the Act was generally accepted as being far from 
perfect", said the RTPI, "it did provide a positive means of 
dealing with green field and inner city development. It seems 
that the Government is merely repealing the Act, which in England 
had not yet even come into force, without taking a considered 
look at the possibilities it offers."
(MacDonald, 1979)
The possibilities offered by the Community Land Act were 
clearly open to question; those offered by its repeal, which 
included a saving of over £50 million per year, apparently were not. 
Thus after four years on the Statute Book, the Land Act passes 
into history.
Objectives and their achievement
The Community Land Scheme had two objectives as stated in 
the Government White Paper "Land" (Cmnd.5730)» published on 
September 12thv 197^s
"a) to enable the community to control the development 
of land in accordance with its needs and priorities;
and
b) to restore to the community the increase in value 
of land arising from its efforts."
(D.o.E., 197^)
Control of development in accordance with community needs 
and priorities could be brought about to the greatest effect, it 
was thought, through public ownership of development land; 
restoration of increase in value of this land,by taxation. The 
Community Land Act 1975 and the Development Land Tax Act 1976 
gave effect to the objectives. The former legislation was:
"An Act to enable local authorities and certain other 
authorities to acquire, manage and deal with land 
suitable for development, and to make other provision 
for and in connection with the public ownership of 
land; to amend planning law and the rules for assessing 
the value of land for compulsory acquisition and other 
cases where compensation is payable; to make provision 
concerning unoccupied office premises; and to establish 
a Land Authority for Wales."
(Community Land Act 1975 
in Parsons and Redding, 1976)
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Under the various stages of operation of the Act, authorities 
would he enabled, and then required, to acquire all land that was 
considered for development. Disposal of this land would take place 
with the consent of the Secretary of State, and its subsequent 
development would be according to terms specified in leases and 
development briefs: the freehold ownership would remain with the 
authority. Thus it was hoped that this development would be in the 
best interests of the community as represented by the local authority. 
In the eventual stage, authorities would buy land at "Current Use 
Value"} or, more accurately, "current use price" as assessed by an 
impartial arbitrator (normally the District Valuer). Its value 
over and above this as land suitable for alternative development 
would not be taken into account on purchase, but would decide the 
price at which it was resold with planning permission enabling this 
development. Thus an authority would buy at Current Use Value and 
sell at future use value, and the difference in price (which had 
formerly been speculation profit) would accrue to the authority; 
and thus, it was hoped, to the community. Hence the achievement 
of the twin objectives as stated in the White Paper "Land". For 
Planning, the Land Scheme was held to be of particular importance.
It would be "planning-led"; that is, it would ensure that development 
conformed with "the proper planning of an area" by specifying the 
terms of this development in leases and briefs on disposal. The 
Planner would move out of the realms of negative controls and 
restrictions into a new world of "positive planning"; he would 
help to decide the type and location of land acquired, the 
improvements necessary for its development, the type of development
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desired thereon and the consequent terms of disposal. Development 
rights had been nationalised in 19^7. Here was the beginnings of 
nationalisation of the land over which these rights were exercised.
To enable local authorities to take land into public ownership, 
certain new acquisition powers were given. These modified existing 
powers of compulsory purchase (as given in the Town and Country 
Planning Act of 1971) thuss
a) The principle of public acquisition would no longer be a valid 
objection to Compulsory Purchase Orders under the Community 
Land Act;
b) The Secretary of State for the Environment would no longer be 
obliged to hold a public enquiry into objections where such an 
enquiry had already been held, for example, for a local plan;
c) Special powers for the compulsory acquisition of land owned 
by other public bodies in an authority's jurisdiction would be 
removed.
(Barrett, Boddy, Stewart, 1978)
Disposal would normally take place according to the General Consent 
given by the Secretary of State in D.o.E. Circular 26/76; that is, 
on the "best terms" that could be obtained on the market. Leasehold 
disposal of up to a maximum of 99 years would apply to land for 
industrial or commercial use, and freehold disposal with an 
assurance that this would be passed on to individual owner-occupiers, 
would apply to land for residential use. Other forms of disposal would 
need the special consent of the Secretary of State. (D.o.E. 1976a)
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The Community Land Act was to have three stages of operations 
in the first stage, which commenced on April 6th, 1976, (the '•First 
Appointed Day"), authorities would have a general duty to "consider 
the desirability" of bringing development land into public ownership 
and to "have regard to" the land needs of all sections of the 
community. In practice, this would involve serving notices of intent 
to acquire or not to acquire land for which planning applications 
for "relevant development" were made. Much development would be 
classed as "Exempt" or "Excepted" to this category: including that 
for agricultural purposes, that on land which haul been in freehold 
ownership since White Paper Day (September 12th, 197^) and certain 
extensions or alterations to existing developments. Authorities 
would also have the power to declare "Disposal Notification Areas", 
from which they would be informed in advance of all proposed disposals 
and would consider the desirability of acquiring the land.
In the second stage (which would commence on different 
"relevant dates" according to local situations) authorities would 
be required to take all land to be developed for a particular use 
into public ownership. Specific "duty orders" would be issued by 
the Secretary of State until they covered development land of every 
type in every authority's jurisdiction. Thus development would only 
take place on land which had passed into public ownership: the 
"Second Appointed Day" would be reached and the Community Land Act 
would become fully operational.
In the interim period, the Development Land Tax Act would apply. 
It is thought that land has two values: existing use value or "the 
value of the land for the purpose of which it was actually being
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used"; and development value, or "an additional value to the use 
value, due to the possibility of a more profitable use" (Town and 
Country Planning Act, 19^7♦ in Leung, 1979)* The former is 
acknowledged in the "Current Use Value" concept of the Community 
Land Act. The latter value may be realised through sale (at a price 
which takes this into account) or development (which puts the land 
to its more profitable use). As a levy on development value realised 
through the sale or change in use of land, Development Land Tax would 
apply, subject to a basic exemption of £10,000 in each financial 
year, at a rate of 66.2/3 per cent on the first £150,000 of realised 
value and at a rate of 80 per cent on the remainder. From April 1st, 
1979, the 80 per cent was applied to all gains above the £10,000.
Local authorities would buy land net of Development Land Tax; in 
effect, tax on the sale of land to a local authority would be payable 
not to the Treasury but to the authority itself. Until authorities 
were empowered to buy land at a price which reflected only Current 
Use Value, the net of tax provisions were hoped to represent sub­
stantial savings.
In practice, the Community Land Scheme never progressed beyond 
the first stage; land dealing activity by local authorities was 
minimal (as at April 1978 only 95^ hectares had been acquired, of 
which 6k hectares had been disposed of) and popular opinion was that 
the Second Appointed Day, originally hoped to be attained by I985 
at the latest, would never materialise. The basis of this belief 
was that a change of Government was more likely than was the imposition 
of any "duty orders" that would have signified the commencement of 
Stage Two; and a change of Government would almost certainly bring
about the repeal of all or part of the Community Land Act. As 
indeed it has.
Ideologies and their application
The Community Land Act and its repeal axe only the most recent 
developments in the land ownership debate. Attempts to tax increases 
in land values go as far back as 1**27; an Act of this year (6 Henry VI 
c.5) assessed contributions to construction costs according to the 
benefits of defence, profit and safeguard conferred by the erection 
of sea walls and sewers by the Commission of Sewers. Arguments 
for the public ownership of land were given vent by Thomas Spence, 
a Newcastle shoemaker; in 1775* "The earth" he said, "was the common 
heritage of mankind but had been usurped by a few people called the 
aristocracy". (Land Campaign Working Party, 1976). He called for the 
restoration of land to its rightful heirs - the people. Spence was
jailed, but his banner was taken up by the Labour Party in its
Manifesto of 1928 which announced that
"it would vest in the nation the ownership of both
agricultural and urban land .... without haste, but
without rest ..... with due compensation to the persons 
affected."
(Newcastle Workers' Chronicle 
June 1975» in Land Campaign 
Working Party, 1976)
It was believed that the removal of the inequality of wealth and
power related to the private ownership of land and buildings was a
major step towards Socialism. Since the Second World War, the Labour
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Party Conference has on six separate occasions passed resolutions 
demanding the full or partial nationalisation of land. Each of the 
three Labour Governments has passed legislation to take development 
land into public ownership and to tax increases in its value.
On the other hand, Conservative Member of Parliament Lord 
Hugh Cecil stated in 1912 that
"the claim of the people, either as users or as an 
organised community, to appropriate either all the 
value of land or any particular increment in that 
value because they have created it and are therefore 
entitled to a share of it different from what they 
can fairly claim in respect to anything else, is 
a pure delusion."
(Cecil, 1912)
To appropriate shares of such value for the community would be 
"to set the State to perform a task which is beyond 
its powers."
(Cecil, 1912)
Conservatism has believed that, subject to certain controls, 
the free market is able to, and should be allowed to, develop 
its own land in its own best interests. Each of the three public 
ownership legislations introduced by post-war Labour Governments 
has been repealed by successive Conservative Administrations.
However,the current Conservative Government has been quick 
to stress that its reasons for repealing the Community Land Act 
are not political but practical.
- 11 -
•’Our reason for abolishing the Community Land Scheme 
is simple s it has not worked." 
says Marcus Fox, the Under Secretary of State for the Environment. 
He goes on to cite the Land Act as:
"an oppressive and expensive piece of bureaucratic 
machinery which has delayed development and created
uncertainty  in the first two years of operation,
the Scheme only provided 95** hectares of land for 
private development; and this at a cost of £33*6 million, 
of which £6.7 million was adminstrative costs."
It also required the administration of 151 Government Circulars.
Furthermore, the Community Land Scheme was unlikely to become 
"self-financing" as originally intended; Future net expenditure 
provision as set out in the last Governments final Public 
Expenditure White Paper of January 1979 was substantial (Table l):
TABLE 1 : FUTURE C.L.A. EXPENDITURE PROVISION (GT.BRITAIN)
YEAR £ MILLION AT 1978 SURVEY PRICES
1979-80 5k
1980-81 6k
1981-82 6k
1982-83 6k
(Hansard, 1979)
In the climate of cutback, it is perhaps unsurprising that the 
Land Scheme was earmarked as an area where savings could be made.
However, Fox's immediate superior, Michael Heseltine, had
- 12 -
stated two years earlier that if he
"could be shown that there is a need for land assembly 
functions to be handed over to local authorities to 
achieve certain specific and desirable aims, I don't 
see why a local authority shouldn't have the power."
(Maddox, 1977)
And on the dismantling of the Community Land Act, it was stated 
by Heseltine that
"local authorities would not be left with any gaps 
in their armoury for acquiring land for development."
(Milne, 1979b)
Their land assembly role would be "maintained and clarified".
Perhaps such promises were intended to silence the lobby within 
the Conservative Party that was keen to see the retention of some, 
if not all, of the Land Act; even so, it appeared that the desirability 
of public dealing in development land was not entirely rejected by 
the Government.
Other moves correspond with this presumption. Michael Latham, 
Conservative M.P. and ex-director of the House Builders' Federation 
has stated that
"Conservatives do agree with a proper level of taxation 
of development value" 
and indeed the Development Land Tax Act has survived the change of 
Government. In the opinion of some, it has survived at a surprisingly 
high level: in his Budget of June 1979» Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Sir Geoffrey Howe, fixed the tax at 60 per cent of all realised 
increases in development value over £50,000 in any year. Thus the
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rate was cut by 20 per cent and the threshold raised by £40,000; 
but Howe was anxious to stress that there would be no further 
changes. The Land Authority for Wales, an executive body which 
was set up to administer the Community Land Act in the Principality, 
has also been retained by the Government after consultation with 
organisations representing Welsh local authorities and the Welsh 
building industry. Its future functions will be of land assembly 
for disposal and to hold against need; in the words of the Secretary 
of State for Wales,
"to make development land available as quickly as possible 
and in circumstances where the private sector found it 
difficult to complete transactions."
The L.A.W. will also be empowered to give advice to local 
authorities on the disposal of surplus land.
As compared to the performance of the Community Land Scheme 
in England and Scotland, in the thirty months between September 31st, 
1976 and March 31st, 1979» the Authority acquired 577*9 hectares and 
disposed of 225.** hectares. During l978-79» its disposals represented 
approximately 30 Per cent of the Welsh Land Market. Its assets and 
liabilities are shown in Table 2 below:
(Hansard, 1979)
TABLE 2 : LAND AUTHORITY FOR WALES : STATISTICS
Assets at 1.4.76 NIL
Estimated net worth at 31*3.79
Average annual gain in net worth
Liabilities at 31*3*79
Assets at 31*3*79 £8,650,000
£4,300,000
£4,350,000
£1,450,000
(L.A.W., 1979b)
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"It would "be churlish to deny that this has been a solid and 
worthwhile contribution to land availability in Wales ", said 
Michael Latham. (Latham, 1979)
Furthermore, the Government has given urgent priority to the 
establishment of "Urban Development Corporations" in the docklands 
of London and Liverpool, To be modelled on New Town Development 
Corporations, these bodies will be responsible for the redevelopment 
of the docklands and to this end will be equipped with executive 
powers of industrial development and promotion, environmental 
improvement, housing and service provision; and land acquisition 
and disposal. (MacDonald, 1979*0 The public ownership of development 
land, at least for a period, is considered vital to the operation of 
the Urban Development Corporations,
It must also be remembered that a Conservative administration 
passed the Town and Country Planning Act of l971t which enabled 
local authority acquisition by agreement or compulsorily subject to 
the Secretary of State’s authorisation, of any land required for 
comprehensive development or redevelopment or "the proper planning 
of an area" (Section 112), The same Conservative Administration, 
in 1973» operated a "mini-land scheme" to cope with soaring house 
prices s £80 million (substantially more money than was provided for 
the operation of the Community Land Scheme,') was made available to 
local authorities to acquire land for disposal to private house­
builders.
The picture that emerges is one of considerably more complexity 
than at first appeared. Conservative ideology may well be opposed to 
the public ownership of land: but in practice, both current and past
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Conservative Governments have introduced legislation and operated 
schemes that rest to some extent on this principle. Practical 
considerations appear to outweigh ideological ones: and Conservative 
opinion was clearly that the Community Land Act was not practical. 
Perhaps it was indeed this belief that formed the basis of the 
Government's decision to repeal the Act. The intriguing conclusion 
is that a practical land scheme; that is, one that achieved its 
desired aims without excessive expense or bureaucracy; may have 
survived under a Conservative administration in the same way that 
the Land Authority for Wales and the Development Land Tax Act have 
survived at present, while the "cumbrous and expensive" Community 
Land Act will not. The question of how desirable such a survival 
would be remains to be considered.
- 16 -
CHAPTER 2
THE PLANNING CONTEXT
The repeal of the Community Land Act will certainly correspond 
with historical experience. As stated in the previous chapter, the 
Land Act and the Development Land Tax Act constitute the third attempt 
since the last war on the part of the Labour Governments to take 
development land into public ownership or to tax increases in its 
value. Each of the attempts have come to naught; schemes have been 
swiftly removed on the succession of Conservative administrations.
Uthwatt and the 19^7 Act
The Uthwatt Report of 19^2 recommended that all development and 
redevelopment rights be vested in the State; and all increases over 
"existing use value" of land prior to development be appropriated by 
the State. Furthermore, on payment of compensation to previous 
landowners, public authorities should be enabled to acquire compulsorily 
or by agreement all land required for development or redevelopment.
The ultimate situation would be one of State ownership of all 
developed land. The Report also proposed a taxation of "betterment", 
defined as
"any increase in the value of land (including the buildings 
thereon) arising from central or local government action,
whether positive, e.g. by the execution of public works
or improvement, or negative, e.g. by the imposition of 
restriction on other lands."
(Uthwatt, 19^2)
The term has since broadened to include any increase in the value of
land due to a cause other than a specific action by the owner of the
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land (Leung, 1979); Uthwatt recommended the imposition of a 75 per 
cent Mbetterment levy" which would he charged on unrealised increases 
in land values over existing use value at a base date: 19^ 9 was 
suggested, with revaluation taking place every five years. In the 
face of political opposition and the discovery of certain administra­
tive flaws, the Town and Country Planning Act of 19^7 drew only 
partially on Uthwatt's recommendations; development and redevelopment 
rights were indeed vested in the State and could only he transferred 
in the form of planning permission, hut compulsory acquisition of 
land at a price reflecting existing use value and disposal at a 
price reflecting future use value was not, as a rule, provided for. 
Local authorities would only he empowered to acquire certain land 
designated in, or for the implementation of, the new Development 
Plans; and would need to obtain ministerial consent before doing so.
As an alternative means of recovering land value increases, a 100 per 
cent Development Charge, calculable on the difference between existing 
and future land use value, was levied on the granting of planning 
permission. Thus all increases in value due to the granting of 
permission would accrue to the State. On land sales, the State would 
also receive the difference between existing use vale (which would 
be paid to the previous owner) and future use value. Thus only 
gains realised through sale or development of land were appropriated; 
unrealised increases in land values did not become subject to a 
betterment levy. To administer the Development Charge and to deal 
with cases for compensation (for which a special £300 million fund 
was established), the Central Land Board was set up.
It soon became clear, however, that the imposition of a 100 per 
cent Development Charge removed from landowners all financial
- 18 -
incentive to sell or to develop. A "development land famine" arose, 
which public authorities were unable to check as they had not been 
equipped with sufficiently clear powers of compulsory acquisition.
The Conservative Party announced its intention to amend the financial 
provisions of the 19^7 Act as soon as it was returned to power; 
developers sat and waited. The Party's day came in 1951; and in 1953» 
legislation was introduced to abolish the Development Charge, disband 
the Central Land Board and extinguish the £300 million fund. The 
following year, a new code of compensation payments was established. 
Confidence was restored to the land market and the famine disappeared: 
at the expense, perhaps of some land and property speculation whereby 
developers would buy land or construct buildings to hold vacant in 
anticipation of price rises.
The Land Commission
The second attempt to secure a public interest in development 
land and its value increases came in 1967. The Land Commission Act 
of this year had two objectives:
"firstly, to secure that the right land was available 
at the right time for the implementation of national, 
regional and local plans;
secondly, to secure that a substantial part of the 
development value created by the community returns 
to the community by collecting a levy on betterment."
(Blyth, I969)
To achieve the former objective, the Land Commission was established. 
Access to a loans fund of £^5 million enabled the Commission to 
purchase land net of betterment levy for disposal at a price reflecting 
its market value. It was given powers of compulsory acquisition over:
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”a) land where there is a current planning permission;
b) land shown in a development plan for purposes which 
may be prescribed by regulation;
c) land designated in a development plan as subject to 
compulsory purchase by a Minister or statutory 
undertaker or local authority;
d) land for the site of a designated New Town;
e) land declared by a local authority to be a clearance 
area."
(Land Commission Office 
for Scotland, 1969)
To achieve the latter objective, a betterment levy of kO per cent
(later to rise to 50 per cent) was to be charged on any gain in
excess of the existing use value of land which was realised through
its sale, by agreement or compulsorily. It was hoped that this rate
would be sufficiently high to prevent undue gains being made by
private landowners, and sufficiently low to give them an incentive
to bring land into development. The Land Commission was given the
task of calculating and collecting the betterment levy.
In practice, the Commission operated at a considerable trading 
loss and was plagued by apparent lack of support from Central 
Government and open hostility from Conservative-controlled local 
authorities. (Stewart, 1973)- Its role in the acquisition and 
management of land for disposal was never fully clarified and the 
collection of the betterment levy (which was passed directly over to 
the Treasury) presented it with problems of calculation, particularly 
where small-scale developments were concerned.
1970 saw the succession of a Conservative Government; the 
following year, the Land Commission was disbanded on the repeal of 
its Act. There followed a period of extremely rapid increase in 
land prices in the "property boom" of the early 1970's. Between 
1970 and 1973> prices trebled and, by holding land and property 
vacant and ready for sale while its market price increased, 
speculative fortunes were made.
The Community Land Scheme
Perhaps this period of land price rise saw the conception of 
the Community Land idea. If large gains were to be made from the 
ownership, development and sale of land, then surely they should be 
made not for a few owners or developers, but for the community at 
large; furthermore, control was needed on a land market that had 
swollen out of all proportion. Control would ensure that development 
was not speculative, or in the financial interests of the few, but 
was in the best interests of the many. The Labour Party was returned 
to power in February 197** and again set about putting its ideas into 
practice; this time, with the Community Land Act and the Development 
Land Tax Act.
However, by the time the Community Land Scheme became operative 
in 1976, land prices had fallen by over 30 per cent from their 1973 
levels; the boom was over. The large gains were no longer there to 
be made and the need for control over the land market was reduced.
The situation became one of "not enough development". The Land Act 
was criticised for its financial wastefulness and its repeal by 
the 1979 Conservative Government is now imminent. Thus another 
attempt has failed; but at least agreement is approached over the
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question of returning ‘betterment gains to the community. The 
Development Land Tax Act has, after adjustments, survived.
It was seen in the last chapter that public ownership of 
development land has been a central issue to Labour Party policy. 
Although the Party response to the repeal of the Community Land Act 
has not yet been formulated, it is likely that the issue will remain 
central; even before the change of government, the Party's environment 
study group was investigating alternative means of bringing development 
land into public ownership (Grant, 1978). Future Labour Governments 
may well be expected to take further steps to achieve it; thus is the 
cycle of legislation and repeal that has been in evidence since the 
last war likely to continue?
Positive Planning
It has been argued that public ownership of development land is 
necessary for the achievement of "positive planning". When land 
ownership functions and planning functions are performed by the same 
public authority (as was the case under the Community Land Scheme), 
not only does the authority have control over development rights, it 
is also able as a landowner to specify the terms of development. In 
practice, land would be disposed of leasehold subject to certain 
covenants specifying these terms; as an additional control, "develop­
ment briefs" would be issued. These would consist of information on 
the land and requirements of the statutory bodies involved in its 
development, together with the aims of the authority for the type of 
development that should take place; (Gazzard, 1978). Such development 
should pay heed to the "planning backing" of Structure and Local Plans.
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Thus the Planner would he involved at all stages, from the drafting 
of these plans to the determination of the type of development that 
should take place on the land disposed of by the local authority.
This final function would be particularly significant as, without 
access to the ownership rights over land, the Planner finds himself 
only able to decide, by development control regulations, the sort of 
development that should not take place. The Planner can only achieve 
ends according to the means available to him and it is thought that 
ownership of development land gives him the means to achieve a great 
deal. In the words of the White I&per "Land" (Cmnd. 5730) s 
"existing powers to implement their plans are restricted 
by the price that the market puts on some land and by 
the fact that the planners' resource is in the hands of 
private owners rather than at the disposal of the
community Public ownership of development land
puts control of our scarcest resource in the hands of 
the community."
(D.o.E., 1974)
On the other hand, it has also been argued that to combine land
dealing functions with Planning functions is to concentrate power
to an undesirable degree. Grant (1978) has stated that:
"awkward policy issues ..... arise from the imposition
of a major trading function on bodies geared primarily
to the provision of services and the regulation of
private enterprise."
Perhaps there is a fear that, while Planning authorities not only
make development decisions but also influence the destination of
land affected by these decisions, considerations other than those
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for development in the best interests of the community may dictate 
to whom, and at what price, local authority-possessed land is sold. 
Perhaps there is also a fear that these new functions would over­
burden Planning departments to the degree that they would not be 
able to carry them out effectively. It must be remembered that, 
under the Community Land Act, local authorities were intended after 
the Second Appointed Day to have control over virtually all 
development land.
Whether one feels that the Planner should be endowed with the 
responsibility of controlling development by the ownership of the 
land concerned, or whether one adopts the view that he is simply 
an adjudicator in the free market and that control over development 
rights alone gives him sufficient means to ensure that development 
is in the best interests of the community, there can be little doubt 
that the constant changing conceptions of the Planner's role and 
the framework within which it is to be performed is damaging to his 
profession. The Planner cannot be expected to perform his new 
functions of "positive planning" if it is clear to all that any scheme 
facilitating this will be dispensed with the instant that a change 
of government occurs. But the implications of successive about-turns 
on the question of public ownership of development land or development 
value surely go deeper than this. It is an indictment of the 
governments that build and tear down the edifices designed to achieve 
these ends, and a sad reflection on the Planning Profession if an 
acceptable solution to the question cannot be found. The Planner's 
control over development rights does not give him the liberty to 
operate in a vacuum and the fact that it has taken over thirty years
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to evolve an acceptable means of taxing the gains that arise mainly 
from this control in the way of betterment says little for the 
appreciation of his responsibilities. If Development Land Tax 
is that acceptable means, then so much the better: but its arrival 
is long overdue.
It must also be remembered that the concept of public ownership 
of development land has been with the Planning System since its 
inauguration. Control over development rights was only half of the 
system as proposed in 19^2 and as implemented in part in 19^ 7; the 
other half would give the Planner control over the raw material upon 
which these rights were to be exercised. To enjoy its intended form 
of operation, perhaps even to achieve its desired results, it may 
be argued that the Planning System needs access to the land that 
would be provided by a local authority land scheme. If this is open 
to question, the notion that it has not been given fair trial with 
this form of operation is not.
An Acceptable Land Scheme
How then, would this fair trial be reconciled with the need for 
a land scheme to be broadly acceptable? In the case of the Community 
Land Act, it has been seen that practical reasons are possibly of 
greater importance to its repeal than are political ones. Judged in 
the Government's own terms, the impracticality of the Land Act was 
brought about by its expense, its bureaucracy and its failure to 
produce results. Criteria of practicality and thus acceptability of 
a land scheme may therefore be assumed to be that it is cheap to 
administer; that it is not excessively bureaucratic; and that it 
produces the desired results. It is felt important that lessons be
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learned from the Community land Act's apparent failure to fulfil 
these criteria; and that these lessons form the basis of 
recommendations for a practical and acceptable land scheme.
If this is the case, then why not, as many do, take the lesson 
from the efficient operation and consequent survival of the Land 
Authority for Wales and establish regional land-trading bodies along 
these lines? Certainly it is not to be denied that the L.A.W. has 
enjoyed considerable success in making land available for development; 
but do such bodies really provide an answer to the question of public 
ownership of development land as a Planning function? The Planner 
has little more access to land possessed by a regional body than to 
land possessed by a private developer. Land control and land owner­
ship remain divided and the Planner remains an adjudicator, even over 
land possessed by the regional body.
Furthermore, the survival of the Land Authority for Wales gives 
no guarantee that a whole series of similar bodies would be acceptable 
to a Conservative Government. In fact, a land scheme that gives 
existing authorities the means but not the duty to achieve certain 
ends may well be more acceptable in a climate of bureaucracy cutback.
But not if it is deemed to be inefficient and ineffective.
Perhaps efficiency may be ensured through its administration; results 
may then be hoped for through an effective framework of implementation.
If the cycle of legislation and repeal that has plagued the Planning 
Profession for thirty-five years is to be broken, efficient adminis­
tration and effective implementation must be ensured in the next attempt. 
But how?
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CHAPTER 3
THE FINANCIAL DISCIPLINE
In the last chapter, both the desirability and importance to 
the Planning Profession of a practical and acceptable local authority 
land scheme was stressed. It would be desirable in that it would 
give the Planner new responsibilities in determining the development 
that should take place; it would be important in that it would 
survive the short terms of party political power, thus redefining 
the Planner's role to some degree of permanence.
However, unless it is equipped with an adequate financial 
framework, any scheme is likely to be subject to the same 
administrative efficiency that caused the unacceptability of the 
Community Land Act; and unless the framework is suited to its 
intended purpose, ineffective implementation is likely to result.
The Act has been described as an attempt 
"to restore the missing financial component of the
Planning apparatus."
(Ash, 1978)
The intentions for "positive planning" outlined in the previous 
chapter were to be enacted through a series of new financial 
measures. These were of particular significance in that they 
imposed an entirely new discipline on local authority land deals.
Land Deals and their Finance
Local authorities are not inexperienced in the field of land 
dealing; land is required for the fulfilment of many of their 
functions. Its acquisition is demanded for the construction of
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council housing or public buildings, or for the provision of public 
open space. Authorities may also choose to acquire land where the 
intention is for ultimate disposal. Acquisition may proceed by 
agreement between the parties concerned, or compulsorily according 
to certain legislative powers. The Town and Country Planning Act 
of 19^4 had given authorities new powers of acquiring land compul­
sorily for a variety of purposes, that of 19^7 had extended these 
powers over land designated thus in the new development plans, and 
that of 1971 empowered the Secretary of State to authorise compulsory 
purchase of any land provided:
Ma) that the land is required .... to secure the treatment
as a whole ....  of any area in which the land is
situated? or
b) that it is expedient that the land should be held 
together with land so required? or
c) that the land is required for development or
redevelopment as a whole f o r  relocation
of population or industry or the replacement of open 
space in the course of the redevelopment or improvement 
 of another axea? or
d) that it is expedient to acquire the land immediately
  to achieve .... the proper planning of an
area.M
(Town & Country Planning Act 1971»
S.112, in Karslake,H.,1972)
Either under these powers, or by agreement, land may be acquired 
for an authority's own purposes or for disposal.
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To facilitate acquisition, a number of financial arrangements 
are made. As a rule, capital must be appropriated either from an 
authority's own capital fund or from a loan. The former is defined 
under the Local Authorities Loans Act, 19^5» as*
"any fund established for the repayment of debt; or as a 
reserve, or for the maintenance, renewal, or repair of 
property, or for superannuation of staff, or for insurance, 
or otherwise for meeting future expenditure of a capital 
or non-recurring nature, or for any like purpose?"
(Local Authorities Loans Act 19^5»
S.8, in Hardacre and Sage, 1965)
Up to certain limits, it may be replenished from sales of assets or 
contributions from revenue. Alternatively, loans may be taken from 
Central Government sources, or, subject to central approval, from 
private sources such as merchant bankers or pension funds.
Capital expenditure as a "once-for-all" outlay finances the 
purchase of the land concerned (and, if the intention is for 
development by the authority itself, provision of buildings and 
plant). The revenue implications of this expenditure which continue 
through time, include land improvements, management and administrative 
expenses and interest charges on loans. These are normally financed 
from an authority's revenue fund, which is replenished by the 
collection of rates on the properties in its jurisdiction.
Arrangements for both capital and revenue finance differ 
according to the purpose for which the land is required. If the 
authority prefers to finance capital expenditure from a Central 
Government loan (and according to the size of the outlay, it is often
to its advantage and convenience to do so),/from one of three 
"sectors" of finance: Key Sector, which is intended to provide for 
schemes which axe part of national policy; Subsidiary Sector, which 
covers projects that are dependent upon Key Sector schemes? and 
Locally Determined Sector, which is an unspecified allocation 
intended to cover any other projects considered. Land for housing 
purposes would be financed from Key Sector? Subsidiary Sector would 
cover land for such purposes as transport and education; and land 
for parks and libraries would draw its capital finance from Locally 
Determined Sector. Locally Determined Sector would also be available 
for land acquisition for private disposal.
Key Sector finance is administered by way of individual loan 
sanctions for schemes having ministerial approval, while Subsidiary 
Sector loans are assumed to be necessary for the execution of 
approved Key Sector schemes and are thus not subject to such detailed 
control. Locally Determined Sector loans are administered en bloc 
without specifications: in England, County Councils subdivide 
allocations according to the schemes considered by their Districts.
Certain land transactions may be deemed to be of particular 
social importance by Central Government and to ensure that they are 
carried out without excessive rates-fund burden, their revenue costs 
may qualify for varying degrees of grant-aid? money extended without 
obligation from the Government to offset a local authority's current 
expenditure in connection with particular schemes. There are five 
main groups of such transactions (A.M.A,, 1975)*
The first group concerns land acquisition for housing purposes. 
Capital expenditure is financed from Key Sector? loans are administered
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on the basis of the local authority-prepared Housing Investment 
Programme (England) or Housing Plan (Scotland). These rolling 
programmes forecast housing requirements and likely resultant 
expenditure. Revenue costs including interest repayments fall 
initially on the Housing Revenue Account and are grant-aided to the 
tune of 66 per cent from Central Government housing subsidies.
The second group concerns land that is needed for purposes of 
slum clearance; this is acquired using Key Sector loans which again 
are controlled through the Housing Investment Programme and Housing 
Plan systems. Central Government pays a grant equivalent to 75 per 
cent of the annual revenue costs (from which any capital receipts 
from the land are discounted).
The third group concerns derelict land that is acquired by an 
authority for purposes of improvement for redevelopment. Capital 
finance is drawn from Key Sector; revenue costs fall initially on 
the rates fund but are assisted by grants ranging from 50 to 100 per 
cent according to the location of the authority in a "Derelict Land 
Clearance Area" as designated under the Government's Regional Policy. 
Disposal receipts reduce the amount of grant-aid payable, but these 
are rarely significant when set against the costs of improvement of 
the land.
In the fourth group is land required for comprehensive redevelop­
ment by the local authority itself. Capital costs are met from Locally 
Determined Sector loans and may be eligible for 50 per cent grant-aid 
on revenue implications, although the amount of aid available does 
not exceed £5 million in any one year.
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The final group concerns land for projects approved under the 
Government's Urban Programme, a system of aid designed to improve 
the quality of life in deprived urban areas. Capital expenditure 
on such projects is financed from Key Sector; revenue expenditure 
is grant-aided to the tune of 75 per cent.
If a local authority prefers to meet capital costs from its own 
resources, it must also carry all revenue implications on its rates 
fund. Clearly, it may appropriate capital as a grant or an interest- 
free loan as it chooses; it is only answerable to itself, after all. 
But capital expenditure has revenue implications other than the 
repayment of interest and using its own resources, the authority 
does not have access to the many forms of revenue grant-aid that 
may have accompanied a Central Government loan. Furthermore, in 
comparison with Central Government resources, a local authority's 
own capital is minimal; and subject to many claims. It is rather 
the freedom that it gives from external restriction that makes the 
internal capital fund an attractive source of finance for land deals.
Thus prior to the operation of the Community Land Act, local 
authority land transactions would be financed according to the 
intended use of the land. From its own point of view, an authority 
had access to three methods of financing;
a) Capital expenditure and revenue expenditure both from its own 
resources;
b) Capital expenditure from Central Government loan; revenue 
expenditure including interest repayment from its own resources;
c) Capital expenditure from Central Government loan; revenue 
expenditure including interest repayment from its own resources, 
aided by grants of up to 100 per cent accordingly.
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Community Land Deals and their Finance
The Community Land Act introduced a fourth method: capital and 
revenue expenditure were to be financed from Central Government loan. 
As a land trading exercise, it was hoped that the scheme would be 
self-financing; and that not only acquisition costs but all revenue 
costs associated with holding and improving land would be recovered 
on the land's disposal for development. Hence it would be possible 
to capitalise all current expenditure and finance it from a loan.
As loans were intended to be used specifically in connection with 
the Community Land Scheme, they would need to come from Key Sector; 
a new fund, "Community Land Key Sector", was established for their 
disbursement. This would be according to five-year "Rolling 
Programmes" of land acquisition and disposal, prepared by the 
authorities themselves in consistency with the objectives of their 
Development Plans. They were intended to show the results of previous 
transactions, proposals for the forthcoming year and estimates for 
the following four years of land to be acquired for residential, 
industrial and commercial development. Acquisitions would not need 
to be expressed in terms of individual sites, but rather by total 
areas, costs and anticipated disposal receipts. Subject to the 
approval of the Rolling Programmes, block loan sanctions would be 
issued annually.
To enable the capitalisation of current expenditure, authorities 
would enter all costs and revenues arising from the operation of the 
Community Land Scheme into their "Land Account Statements "; a copy 
of a Statement is shown in Appendix 1. The Statements would have two 
sections: the Surplus Account, which would irecord total costs and
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revenues, and the Profit and Loss Account, which would only record 
costs and revenues on transactions carried out in the preceding 
financial year. The Surplus Account would be a cumulative Statement; 
the Profit and Loss Account would relate only to one year and would 
be drawn up afresh annually. In the Surplus Account, costs would 
include expenditure on land acquisitions and improvements, management 
expenses, administration costs and interest on borrowings; credited 
against these would be revenue in respect of land disposals or 
appropriations to other accounts and other income from land on hand. 
The Land Accounts would be closed at the end of the year while total 
deficit or surplus was calculated. If a deficit, this would be rolled 
forward to the Land Account of the following year; if a surplus, this 
would be divided in the ratio of 40:30:30. 40 per cent would be
appropriated by the Secretary of State to pass to the Treasury's 
Consolidated Fund; 30 per cent would pass into an "Equalisation Fund" 
for redistribution to those authorities whose Land Accounts were in 
deficit; and 30 per cent would be retained by the local authority.
The authority would not be permitted to use the retained portion to 
finance further expenditure under the Scheme; it would be credited to 
other projects in place of borrowing approvals which would otherwise 
have been given. Thus the spending capacity of authorities would not 
be increased by the generation of Land Account Surpluses; they would 
simply save interest payments on loans that had already received 
approval.
Clearly, certain problems would arise from this method of 
operation. Rate-fund isolation and effective appropriation of 70 per 
cent of all surpluses would perhaps give authorities strong incentives 
to pursue "dual land schemes" (Barret, Boddy and Stewart, 1978)» with
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Community Land finance being used to "carry" unprofitable trans­
actions while profitable deals were financed from alternative 
sources and generated capital and revenue for the authorities' own 
uses. To insure against this possibility, it was directed that, after 
the First Appointed Day, all land purchased for private disposal, 
whatever the source of finance, would become "Community Land" and 
would need to pass through the Land Accounts. Thus local authorities 
would be obliged to accept the new arrangements.
However, there were important exceptions to this rule. Land 
purchased before the First Appointed Day and disposed of during the 
operation of the Land Scheme would not need to pass through the 
Accounts. Neither would grant-aided transactions. As recognised 
loss-making deals which nonetheless provided worthwhile social 
benefits, these were felt inappropriate to the Land Scheme. Much 
has been made over the aim of the Scheme to be "planning-led"; yet 
its objective was to acquire a public share in development land 
rather than land that needed substantial improvement before 
development could even be considered. Derelict land, slum clearance 
land, land for comprehensive redevelopment and for Urban Programme 
projects would continue to be catered for elsewhere. Although 
accumulation of funds from profitable land deals may have given 
authorities the liberty to pursue certain loss-making schemes under 
the Community Land Act, the general intention was that they would 
concern themselves with regulating the development that would have 
been considered by the private sector in any case. Rather than a 
method of pursuing social goals at the expense of financial ones, 
the Community Land Scheme is more correctly seen as an attempt to 
secure a Planning control over the land market; both the development
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and the profits created therein. Community Land Key Sector finance 
was not grant-aided; authorities were liable for the full repayment 
of all loans, and were thus hoped to concern themselves with land 
deals that would enable this by recouping their outlay. Whether 
the arrangements for its administration, which insulated authorities 
from all debt until land was disposed of, made Community Land 
Finance appear to be a form of grant-aid and thus be used to other 
purposes, remains to be seen.
Practical Experience
In practice, matters were rather different to intentions; the 
Community Land Scheme enjoyed a chequered history and many of its 
operational difficulties centred on its financial arrangements. To 
make provisions for changing circumstances, these were continually 
altered.
Conceived in a time of land and property price boom (1972-73)* 
the Scheme came into operation during the subsequent slump both in 
prices and in development activity. No longer was there competition 
for land; the need for control over the market was reduced. The 
broader economic situation of inflation and public expenditure 
cutbacks led to substantial reductions in the Scheme's budget. 
Revisions in December 1976 slashed funds by £35 million for each of 
the following years and this trend has continued (Table 3)*
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TABLE 3 s COMMUNITY LAND SCHEME : CAPITAL EXfENDITURE 
WHITE PAPER £ MILLION PER YEAR
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
zJl zJl Z2 - 80 - 81 - 82 z M
Feb.1976 31.3 76.7 102 102
Dec.1976 41.7 67
Rib.1977 38 64 102
Jan.1978 64 83
Jan.1979 54 64 64 64
(Grant, 1978 and Hansard, 1979)
With these budget reductions, tighter controls on expenditure were 
clearly thought necessary* Guidance Note for Local Authorities (GNLA) 
No. 12, entitled "Effects of Public Expenditure Cuts" and issued in 
December 1976 dispensed with the proposed system of Rolling Programmes 
(which had never in fact been introduced). Authorities would continue 
to apply for loan sanction by individual site: a supposed temporary 
method of operation that had been used in the initial stages to give 
time for the drafting of Rolling Programmes. They would need to 
submit detailed particulars of proposed expenditure by year and 
would not normally have sanction approved unless rapid turnover and 
financial benefit was assured according to the following criteria*
"a) Housing Land* Disposal within two years of acquisition 
for a consideration which at least recoups the total 
cost of purchase, any essential servicing and interest 
charges;
b) Industrial Land* Disposal within three years of acquisition
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for a mix of premium and rental payments which recoups 
at least half the total costs incurred in that time;
c) Commercial Land: Prospective purchasers should have 
been identified and there should be an assurance of 
disposal within 18 months. Additionally the disposal 
should attract a mix of premium and rental payments 
which recoup at least half the total cost incurred 
within 3 years of acquisition."
(D.o.E., 1976c)
Although the Note also stated that consideration would still be 
given to schemes which failed to meet the criteria but which had 
"powerful planning and social arguments in favour of 
early local authority intervention," 
the emphasis was clearly on profitability.
GNLA 14, issued in September 1977* relaxed the criteria a little, 
substituting the word "strong" for "powerful" and stating that loss- 
making schemes which nevertheless were important to local employment 
and inner city regeneration would be considered for loan sanction.
But the Land Scheme's budget was not increased.
Neither was it increased with the issuing of GNLA 17 in March 1978* 
which rescinded GNLA's 12 and 14 and introduced more flexible criteria 
for the approval of loan sanction, or GNLA 19, issued in November 1978. 
However, the latter Note was particularly significant in that it 
once again encouraged authorities to draw up Rolling Programmes for 
one year ahead instead of five as originally intended in 1976.
"Financial profiles" would be provided for the ensuing five years, 
but block loan sanction would only be given for the yearly Rolling 
Programmes. The final submission date for these was the last day of
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January, 1979.
The Note also stated that for "an experimental period" of five 
years, authorities would he allowed to retain 50 per cent of their 
Land Account surpluses instead of the previous share of 30 per cent. 
The share intended for redistribution would fall from 30 per cent 
to 20 per cent and the Treasury share from kO per cent to 30 per cent.
In less certain terms, the consideration of joint schemes 
between authorities was encouraged, and the possibility of risk- 
sharing for "exceptional"schemes introduced; whereby authorities 
would be required to accept some of the land holding charges on their 
rates funds. Finally, future borrowing capacity would be decided 
at least in part by the sizes of surplus generated, or deficit 
incurred,in the past.
It was hoped that these measures would go some of the way 
towards removing the deterrents to local authority operation of the 
Land Scheme that had become only too obvious through considerable 
under-spending (Table :
TABLE k : LOCAL AUTHORITY EXPENDITURE UNDER
THE COMMUNITY LAND ACT
£ MILLION PER YEAR 
1976-77 1977-78 1978-79
Budgeted 31*3 38 6k
Actual 13 20 36
(Grant, I978 and Building, 1979)
"I look forward with confidence," said Guy Barnett, Under Secretary 
of State for the Environment, in December 1978. (Milne, l979a)•
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He was mistaken; in effect, all the measures came too late. 
Within six months there was a change of government and one of the 
first moves of the new Conservative Administration was to issue 
GNLA 20 which stated that, while loan sanctions already given for 
the current financial year would he honoured, no new sanctions would 
he issued excepting:
"where the authority can show that they were under a 
clear legal or moral obligation to acquire,"
or
"where ....  it would he sensible to acquire further
land - for example, to complete an exercise in land 
assembly in order to secure early disposal of land 
already acquired."
(D.o.E., 1979)
Authorities were also freed from all restrictions on disposal of 
land. Thus the Community Land Act would remain law until such time 
as its repeal could he enacted, hut its financial hacking was 
effectively removed, rendering it virtually inoperative. Financial 
arrangements are the "teeth" of any land scheme; legislation may 
allow, hut finance enables its operation and without financial 
hacking, it exists in name only. That this hacking is sound is 
thus of utmost importance. Efficiency of administration and 
effectiveness of implementation are perceived to he the two require­
ments of a practical and acceptable land scheme. Clearly, finance is 
central to the question of efficiency; hut, in that it must he 
administered in such a way that gives incentive and ease to apply 
a scheme to its intended use, finance is also central to the issue
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of effectiveness. Provide a sound financial backing; one that 
ensures the best use of available resources and is suited to 
the intended form of operation; and perhaps one has also provided 
for the success and survival of a land scheme.
The question that arises is, judged in these terms, how sound 
was the financial backing of the Community Land Scheme? It is 
believed that this question can be answered to the greatest degree 
of satisfaction by those authorities who were given the task of 
operating the Land Scheme; and thus being subject to its financial 
framework.
"Key Areas"
Authorities would implement programmes under the Community 
Land Scheme in three stages: they would submit schemes to Central 
Government for approval to obtain loan sanction; carry out acquisition, 
management and improvement of land for disposal according to these 
schemes; and dispose of land on their completion. The new financial 
discipline may be seen to correspond with these three stages.
The initial stage, of approval by Central Government, involves 
the issuing of loan sanction and the basis for this; yearly, by 
individual site according to strict criteria specified in successive 
GNLA's. This contrasts on the one hand with the original intention 
to give loans en bloc for use in connection with Rolling Programmes, 
^and on the other hand with authorities* previous land finance 
arrangements.
The second stage, of implementation of land programmes, involves 
the operation of the Land Accounts; their intended self-financing 
nature which allowed capitalisation of current expenditure; their
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isolation from authorities' rates funds; their annual closure 
necessitated by this form of operation; and their imminent final 
closure with the repeal of the Community Land Act.
The third stage, of disposal of land, involves the issue of 
the division of any surpluses between the authority, Central 
Government and the Equalisation Fund; and the subsidisation of 
any deficits by the Government from the Equalisation Fund.
In summary, the three stages of operation of the Community 
Land Act and the corresponding "Key Areas" of the financial 
discipline are shown in Table 5 below*
TABLE 5 : FINANCIAL OPERATION OF THE COMMUNITY LAND ACT
STAGE "KEY AREAS"
1. Approval of schemes Loan sanction
by Central Government (individual sites; strict criteria;
Rolling Programmes; authorities' 
previous arrangements)
2. Implementation of Operation of Land Accounts
schemes (self-financing; capitalisation
of current expenditure; rate-fund 
isolation; annual closure; 
final closure)
3. Disposal of land Division of surplus/financing
of deficit
(40*30*30 division; Equalisation 
Fund)
Here, then, is a framework for analysis. It is to be hoped that 
a study of the experiences of a number of authorities with respect to 
each of the "Key Areas" may allow generalisatiom to be made on the 
financial operation of the Community Land Act; and that, on the 
basis of these, recommendations may be made that ensure the 
arrangements of any future land scheme fulfil the criteria of efficiency 
and effectiveness that appear to be crucial to its practicality and 
acceptability.
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CHAPTER 4
THE DISCIPLINE IN PRACTICE
In the last chapter, three "Key Areas" of the new financial 
discipline imposed on local authority land dealing by the Community 
Land Act were identified. It was seen that the questions of loan 
sanction, operation of Land Accounts and division of surpluses or 
financing of deficits corresponded with the three stages of operation 
of the Community Land Scheme: approval of schemes, their implementation 
and the disposal of land on their completion.
However, to assess the operation of the Community Land Act 
in a broader framework, another key area may be added: that of local 
authority land dealing under alternative arrangements that existed 
before and in some cases during the operation of the Community Land 
Act. As has been seen, local authorities have had land dealing 
powers for many years and the question of how the new arrangements 
introduced by the Community Land Act affected their practices here 
should be answered.
Thus analysis of the sequence of "Key Areas” may be preceded by 
a review of local authority involvement in land dealing:
^Lo a n  Sanction
A
L.A.Land Dealing 4 Community Land Act  ----- Operation of Land Accounts
A
^Division of Surpluses
The Local Authorities and their Study
Fourteen local authorities were approached for the study:
South Yorkshire, Tyne and Wear and West Midlands Metropolitan
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County Councils; Warwickshire and Hereford and Worcester County 
Councils; Coventry, Stoke-on-Trent and Liverpool City Councils; 
Newcastle-under-Lyme, Chamwood, Middlesbrough, Wolverhampton and 
Hinckley and Bosworth Borough Councils; and the Peak Ih,rk Planning 
Board. Stoke-on-Trent, Liverpool and Hinckley and Bosworth Councils 
and the Peak Park Planning Board stated that they could be of little 
assistance to the study. In the interests of convenience, the 
invitations from Hereford and Worcester and Middlesbrough Councils 
were declined; and in the interests of avoiding a West Midlands 
bias, so too were the invitations from Wolverhampton and West Midlands 
Councils. Thus the Key Areas were studied in terms of six local 
authorities:
1. South Yorkshire Metropolitan County Council;
2. Tyne and Wear Metropolitan County Council;
3. Warwickshire County Council;
A+. Coventry City Council;
5. Newcastle-under-Lyme Borough Council; and
6. Chamwood Borough Council.
Six was thought to be a sufficient number of authorities on the one 
hand, to allow detailed studies to be made of their experience with 
the Community Land Act's financial arrangements in the time and space 
available, and on the other hand, to allow certain generalisations to 
be made that are hopefully applicable in a wider context.
The mix was also felt to include a variety of circumstances: 
political control differed, both at the time of the study and during 
the operation of the Community Land Act; different/financial measures, 
based on such as Regional Development Policy, were available to
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authorities; different priorities and policies existed accordingly; 
areas of jurisdiction and power differed between County and District. 
Reviews of the authorities and their jurisdictions are given in 
Appendix 2.
The survey was carried out principally by use of questionnaire 
interview; a-copy of the questionnaire is shown in Appendix 3* It 
was designed in such a way as to elicit both factual information 
and personal and professional opinion on the operation of the 
Community Land Act in terms of each of the Key Areas. Every effort 
was made to ensure the objectivity of the questions and to ensure 
that the opinions expressed were those of the interviewee and not the 
interviewer. In addition, information was taken from Land Account 
Statements, Land Policy Statements, Rolling Programmes and Committee 
Agendas and, less formally, officials were allowed to elaborate at 
length on some of their opinions after the questions had been 
answered. While many local authorities had very limited dealings 
under the Community Land Act, they were all obliged to operate Land 
Accounts and thus to submit to the financial discipline. As this 
forms the focus of the study, the questionnaire interview survey 
was directed at financial officials; Treasurers and their Assistants, 
Group Accountants and Technical Directors. Clearly, a comprehensive, 
in-depth study of the Community Land Act would need to take information 
and opinions from other departments, such as Planning and Estates, as 
well as from Councillors themselves. But to the purpose of proposing 
a new financial discipline on the basis of the experience of that 
introduced by the Community Land Act, information and opinions from 
finance departments were felt to be of most value.
A blank Land Account Statement is shown in Appendix 1. The 
factual information from the authorities' Statements is tabulated
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in Appendix *f; reference will be made both to this and to the 
figures constructed in Appendix 5 from some of the statistics 
contained therein throughout the analysis of the questionnaire 
survey which follows.
Local Authority Land Dealing
The findings according to the question of local authority land 
dealing bear several consistencies. As was postulated, the general 
picture is one of considerable experience in the field of land 
dealing. Tyne and Wear and Newcastle-under-Lyme Councils even went 
so far as to say that they dominated the industrial land markets 
in their respective jurisdictions. The former stressed that the 
local land market was stagnant; that is, that there was not enough 
development. Thus it was the responsibility of the Council to provide 
land for development; or more normally, provide the development itself. 
Its programme of Construction of Advance Factory Units demanded that 
plots of land be obtained leasehold from District Councils, then 
disposed of leasehold to industrialists. This policy of acting in 
place of "the missing developer" in a depressed area had been in 
existence since 1975* The industrial land market in Newcastle-under- 
Lyme seemed to be in a more healthy state than that in Tyne and Wear, 
but similarly, the land disposed of by the Council ("normally ten 
acres per year") was enough to dominate it, and officials spoke of 
a long-standing policy of disposal of small industrial sites.
Warwickshire and Chamwood Councils, while not enjoying the 
apparent market dominations of Tyne and Wear and Newcastle-under- 
Lyme Councils, had both had experience in operating long-term rolling 
programmes of opportunity purchase of land for private disposal.
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Chamwood1 s began with the acquisition of an aerodrome for development 
as an industrial site before the Second World War: the disposal of 
this site provided the capital for further acquisitions either for 
development by the Council in advance of private disposal or simply 
for disposal without development. Warwickshire had operated a 
programme of acquisition of greenfield sites on urban peripheries 
for maintenance as smallholdings estates until the time was ripe for 
disposal.
Coventry City Council is in an unusual position: it has owned 
much of the land in its densely-populated and highly-developed 
jurisdiction since the City's redevelopment after Second World War 
bomb devastation and had thus had little recent experience of land 
acquisition. However, possession of any land requires both management 
and formulation of terms for leasehold disposal and the Council seemed 
to be well-experienced in these areas if not in recent acquisition.
Finally, even though land acquisition for private disposal had 
not been a practice of South Yorkshire County Council prior to the 
operation of the Community Land Act, officials spoke of their difficul­
ties in acquiring land for refuse disposal. Even at this level, a 
local authority is obliged to have some contact with the land market, 
and though activity levels may differ, the picture of considerable 
experience in dealing with land remains.
It might perhaps be expected that this activity is conducted 
in accordance with well-developed land policies; but this was not 
borne out by the study. Only in the cases of Tyne and Wear and 
Newcastle-under-Lyme did land policies exist; of industrial development 
for the creation of employment and acquisition of land to facilitate 
such development. As stated above, both Warwickshire and Chamwood
-  k7 -
Councils conducted their land acquisition and disposal programmes 
on the basis of opportunity purchase; activities were thus conditioned 
by the nature of the land available at any time and not by any 
conscious policy, "We simply hope to use the resources we have 
to make for the development of our main centre, Loughborough." 
said an official of Chamwood Council. Neither did South Yorkshire 
or Coventry Councils, which, it will be remembered, had only limited 
experience of land acquisition and disposal, conduct their affairs 
according to a policy.
The question that arises, therefore, is did the operation of 
the Community Land Act affect either the level of local authority 
land dealing, or the policy that this was, or wasn't, conducted in 
accordance with? The answer is largely no in either case. Only in 
South Yorkshire and Coventry did it give the Council the means and 
the motivation both to expand their dealings in land and to formulate 
a policy accordingly. South Yorkshire took up the policy of 
industrial development for employment creation with not inconsiderable 
enthusiasm: the Council had not involved itself to a great extent in 
land dealing before the operation of the Community Land Act, but the 
availability of capital finance with no apparent rate-fund burden 
gave it the impetus to pursue ambitious schemes in accordance with 
this new policy area. At the end of 1978-79* the Council held 106.04 
hectares of Community Land (Appendix 4 and Figure 2, Appendix 5); 
nearly ten times as much as its nearest rival, Tyne and Wear Council 
(Appendix 4 and Figure 4). One such ambitious scheme was the acquisition 
of land for leasehold disposal to industrialists as part of a proposed 
170-acre industrial estate at Carcroft, to the north of Doncaster.
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The total cost of acquisition and management of just one-fifth of 
the site stood at £226,384 on March 31st, 1979, and the Council 
was eager to complete the scheme although it classed the site as 
"marginal".
Officials of Coventry Council stated that all of the land that 
was acquired or attempted to he acquired under the Community Land 
Act would not otherwise have been considered. Neither would the 
Land Policy, which was largely one of "unblocking ownership problems 
on difficult sites" and use of Compulsory Purchase powers to assemble 
sites for disposal to developers, have been formulated. The reason 
given for this was that the Community Land Act allowed Compulsory 
Purchase Orders to be made on land that was intended for private 
disposal per se. However, the availability of an extra source of 
finance specifically intended for land in a time of stringency else­
where was also acknowledged as an incentive. In the cases of Tyne 
and Wear, Warwickshire, Newcastle-under-Lyme and Chamwood, Councils 
continued to pursue their former land policies or programmes of 
opportunity purchase under a different financial discipline. However, 
while they all reported that their levels of land dealing had not 
altered under the Community Land Act, some appreciated that the extra 
finance provided under the Act at least enabled them to maintain 
previous levels when many other activities were subject to economy. 
Only Chamwood Council seemed hostile to the Community Land Act: 
officials reported that its complex financial arrangements constituted 
a short-term restriction on their programme of land acquisition and 
disposal.
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Loan Sanction
The first of the "Key Areas" of the new financial discipline 
introduced by the Community Land Act has been identified as loan 
sanction on approval of schemes by Central Government. As has been 
seen, with certain exceptions, the Act placed all land deals where 
the intention was for private disposal into a Land Account which 
would be financed by loans from the newly-created Community Land 
Key Sector. The mechanics for obtaining finance for such deals would 
thus be changed considerably. The local authorities of the study 
found themselves in a number of different situations. The most 
popular source of finance for land acquisitions for private disposal 
before the operation of the Community Land Act was the capital 
possessed, and the revenue generated, by the authority itself.
South Yorkshire, Warwickshire and Chamwood Councils conducted their 
land deals thus. Tyne and Wear, Coventry and Newcastle-under-Lyme 
Councils, on the other hand, preferred to proceed by borrowing 
money from Central Government. The argument for using internal 
capital and revenue was that it gave authorities the freedom to use 
money as they wished and not be subject to external constraints that 
would accompany loans obtained from other sources. If they had to 
be answerable to anyone, the authorities would prefer to be answerable 
to themselves. The argument for borrowing money from Central Govern­
ment was that land is a long-term asset and thus a low priority for 
use of indigenous funds* whereas a loam may be repaid over a long 
period of time while the asset begins to earn money. Of course, by 
proceeding thus, Councils incur interest repayment charges* these 
and other revenue implications fall on their rates funds. However,
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in the cases of Tyne and Wear (where money was borrowed from 
Urban Programme funds) and Newcastle-under-Lyme (where Derelict 
Land Key Sector finance was used) this repayment was grant-aided to 
the tune of 75 per cent and 100 per cent respectively. Only Coventry 
had to incur the full interest charges, on loans from Locally 
Determined Sector.
As stated in the previous chapter, "grant-aided" land remained 
outside the Community Land Accounts: thus South Yorkshire, Tyne and 
Wear and Newcastle-under-Lyme Councils had access to Urban Programme 
and Derelict Land funds during the operation of the Community Land Act. 
These authorities thus had alternative means of financing land acqui­
sitions for private disposal, while in the cases of Warwickshire, 
Coventry and Chamwood, Community Land Key Sector loans were reported 
to replace the former sources of finance completely.
The question that must be asked is, which was the preferred 
source of finance and why? Of the six local authorities studied, 
only two - South Yorkshire and Tyne and Wear - preferred the system 
introduced by the Community Land Act; and the favour of the latter 
was tempered with bitterness at having budgeted for, and not obtained, 
loan sanctions for a number of schemes. The Councils' stated reason 
for preferring to operate with Community Land Key Sector finance 
was that it enabled them to incur large debts without suffering 
rates-fund burdens. Even Urban Programme loans, whose revenue 
implications are 75 per cent grant-aided, impose burdens to some 
degree.
Why, then, were the Community Land Act's financial arrangements 
unpopular with the other four local authorities? Both Warwickshire
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and Chamwood Councils, which it will he remembered, operated 
rolling programmes of opportunity purchase financed by indigenous 
capital and revenue funds prior to the Community Land Act, claimed 
that it entailed an undesirably high degree of dependence upon 
Central Government. Newcastle-under-Lyme Council, which, being in 
a Derelict Land Clearance Area, was fortunate enough to have access 
to Derelict Land Key Sector loans (repayments of which are 100 per 
cent grant-aided) during the operation of the Community Land Act, 
were unhappy with the requirement that 70 per cent of all surpluses 
would be appropriated by Central Government. Coventry's criticism 
was that the loan sanctions were administratively complex in a way 
that Locally Determined Sector loan arrangements (which involve 
submission of schemes to the County Council for financial approval) 
had never been.
Thus from the point of view of the local authority, the 
adequacy of Community Land Key Sector loans as alternative means of 
financing land deals is open to some question. A variety of sources 
of finance were available to local authorities before, and in some 
cases during, the operation of the Community Land Act, and in the 
majority of instances, these were preferred to Community Land Key 
Sector loans. The sources available and the sources preferred are 
summarised in Table 6 overleaf.
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TABLE 6 : FINANCING OF LAND DEALS
LOCAL AUTHORITY SOURCE OF FINANCE FOR LAND INTENDED
FOR PRIVATE DISPOSAL
S. Yorkshire 
Tyne & Wear 
Warwickshire 
Newcastle-u-Lyme
PRE-CLA
CAP-REV
UP / LDS
CAP-REV
J
DLKS
J
Coventry LDS
J
Chamwood CAP-REV
J
Kejr
CAP-REV t Capital and Revenue Funds
UP * Urban Programme
LDS : Locally Determined Sector
CLKS : Community Land Key Sector
DLKS : Derelict Land Key Sector
J : Preferred source of finance
DURING CLA 
CLKS / UP
J
CLKS / UP
J
CLKS
CLKS / DLKS
J
CLKS
CLKS
Suggestions of how the Community Land Act could have been better 
financed centred largely on the theme of more money or power to 
local authorities. Tyne and Wear Council would have preferred 
block loan sanctions to individual site loan sanctions, to tie in 
with its well-developed three-year programme of industrial development. 
This programme, originally drafted in 1978 (although industrial 
development policies had been in existence since 1975)*demanded
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both improvements in "basic industrial infrastructure" such as road 
access and drainage, and provision of new or refurbished premises 
by way of advance factory construction. Land acquisition is central
to the programme, and block loans would have given the Council freedom
to pursue a number of schemes over more than one year.
Newcastle-under-Lyme Council would have preferred to keep a
greater proportion of the surpluses on Community Land deals, in the 
same way that it had kept any surpluses arising from its Derelict Land 
deals - the revenue costs of which, it will be remembered, are 100 per 
cent grant-aided. Warwickshire and Chamwood Councils saw Joint 
Accounts, under which surpluses and deficits were shared throughout 
the County, as the great failure. They would have preferred to have 
operated free from such restrictions. Coventry Council, on the other 
hand, suggested that Community Land Act borrowing should have been 
financed from the rates to encourage local authorities to operate 
efficiently. Only South Yorkshire Council was happy with the 
arrangements as they stood.
To look at some of the measures of loan sanction in greater 
detail, it appears that sanctions by individual site were unpopular 
as they had operated. They were criticised for being complicated, 
long-winded, inefficient and cumbersome. In particular, the expiry 
of loan sanctions at the end of each financial year and the delay 
entailed in re-application hampered the implementation of schemes.
But perhaps the picture is not entirely black: only Warwickshire 
Council questioned the validity of Central Government opinion over 
local authority opinion concerning individual sites for which sanction 
would be applied, and South Yorkshire and Newcastle-under-Lyme Councils
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were perfectly happy with the arrangements. In the words of an 
official of Newcastle-under-Lyme Council:
"We would prefer to make a strong case and obtain loan sanction for 
a scheme then be left to proceed without Central Government inter­
ference than to have our programmes subjected to a continuous 
scrutiny".
Furthermore, the criteria of profitability and rapid disposability 
of land that were applied to such sanctions were appreciated by 
the majority of the local authorities. It will be remembered that 
GNLA 12 specified that loan sanctions would only be granted on 
commercial land where disposal recouping at least half of total costs 
was assured within eighteen months; on housing land where disposal 
recouping at least total costs was assured within two years; and on 
industrial land where disposal recouping at least half of total costs 
was assured within three years. Officials could understand the 
Government's reasons for imposing such criteria; Warwickshire and 
Chamwood Councils understood that money was in short supply and its 
economical use had to be ensured, while Coventry and Newcastle-under- 
Lyme Councils appreciated the strict financial discipline that the 
criteria imposed upon local authority land dealing.
"As an educational exercise in obliging local authorities to look 
at land deals as business ventures" said an official of Newcastle- 
under-Lyme Council, "the Community Land Act should not be underestimated." 
Only Tyne and Wear and South Yorkshire Councils thought the criteria 
totally unrealistic and unacceptable. The former stressed that local 
land deals could only hope to come into profit between twenty and 
twenty-five years after acquisition. Oddly, the latter's deals did
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not appear to be subject to such scrutiny; officials claimed that 
Central Government never looked for a profit and never refused a 
loan sanction. The Council's attitude was that it had been given the 
freedom to roll up debts on land deals indefinitely. The extent of 
the debts may be perceived from the Land Account deficit shown in 
Appendix k and Figure 1; at a Figure approaching £1.5 million at the 
end of 1978-79» it was by far the highest amongst those of the study.
It may be added that the possibility of repayment of the deficit at 
the end of the current financial year has caused officials to revise 
their views somewhat.
Despite the unpopularity of individual site loan sanction as it 
operated, the apparent alternative, that of Rolling Programmes based 
on block loans, was not preferred: few authorities operated to such 
programmes and even those that did would have been unable to draw 
out acquisition, management and disposal forecasts for future years. 
Opinion was that unforeseeable circumstances made such forecasts unreal­
istic and impractical. Coventry Council thought it similarly unrealistic 
for Central Government to be in a position to extend block loans and 
risk "rapidly snowballing" losses; to a greater extent than had been 
the case under individual site loan sanction as shown in Figures 1, 3*
5 and 7* one imagines. Only Tyne and Wear and Warwickshire Councils 
would have preferred block loans to individual site loans and only 
the former seemed to have a valid case for needing them: as stated 
above, the Council operates a three-year rolling programme of factory 
construction which necessarily takes land requirements into consider­
ation. Warwickshire, on the other hand, proceeds by opportunity 
purchase.
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The interest rates charged on loans from Community Land Key 
Sector, which were set notionally at the beginning of each financial 
year, were widely criticised as being unnecessarily high. Most of 
the authorities of the study pooled their loans into Consolidated 
Loans Funds, for which single interest rates apply to all borrowing 
transactions. Community Land loans remained external to the Funds 
and only in the latter stages of the Act's operation (for the 
financial year commencing at April 1979) were authorities charged 
similar rates to those applying to their Consolidated Loans Funds. 
Calculation of a separate interest rate for a particular borrowing 
transaction was seen to present problems; accountants felt that it 
complicated matters to no avail.
The repeated "changing of rules" by Central Government according 
to the availability or otherwise of finance was largely resented by 
the local authorities. GNLA 12, which was responsible for introducing 
the criteria of profitability and rapid disposability outlined above 
as well as cutting the budget of the Community Land Scheme by almost 
half, was seen as having a "deadening effect".
"The Community Land Act had become a centrally-controlled scheme ..... 
it fell foul of GNLA 12 and never recovered," said an official of 
Coventry Council.
The opinion was echoed by a Charnwood Council official:
"GNLA 12 showed that the Government had placed the Community Land Act 
on the shelf. Consequently, we too lost interest."
Authorities were seemingly sceptical of the promises of GNLA 19, which, 
coming near the end of the period of operation of the Community Land 
Act, intended to replace individual site loan sanctions with block 
loans based on Rolling Programmes, and to allow local authorities
- 57 -
to keep greater proportions (50 per cent) of any surpluses.
"It came too late and brought too little," stated an official of 
Charnwood Council.
Only Tyne and Wear Council seemed to show any enthusiasm: it 
budgeted for much more Community Land Act money, only to have the 
unpleasant experience of being refused loan sanctions totalling one 
million pounds by the present Government. Being morally committed 
to programmes, officials have been left to find the money from other 
sources and describe the loss of the sanctions as "a tragedy". Their 
impression was that they had been misled.
Operation of Land Accounts
The second "Key Area" of the Community Land Act's financial 
discipline has been identified as the operation of the Community Land 
Accounts. To isolate these from the rates, it was necessary to 
capitalise all current expenditure on land intended for private 
disposal; it was assumed that the ensuing large capital debt would be 
paid from the proceeds of disposal of the improved land.
Without exception, the Land Accounts of those authorities studied 
were in deficit for each of the years of operation, although extent 
of deficit differed as may be seen from Appendix k and Figures 1, 3»
5, 7# 9 and 11. However, Warwickshire, Newcastle-under-Lyme and 
Chamwood Councils estimated that their Accounts would soon move into 
surplus as they disposed of improved land. Newcastle's had been 
moving in the right direction since 1976-77 (Figure 9) and was 
already £150,000 in surplus by November 1979. Although Warwickshire 
and Chamwood's deficits were growing (Figures 5 and 11), the Councils' 
intended appropriations or disposals of land were expected to reverse
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the trends. In these cases, if not in others, the indication is that
the Community Land Act is to be repealed just before it begins to show
financial benefits.
Authorities were reluctant to admit that they had had difficulty
in operating the Land Accounts, although most reported that they were
complicated and confusing. The division of Accounts into surplus/deficit 
(to cover total costs and revenues) and profit/loss (to cover those on 
land dealing in one year only) appeared to present problems.
The isolation of the Accounts from the rates funds was favoured 
by most of the local authorities. It enabled them to undertake 
financially risky schemes (which nevertheless yielded "planning gain" 
or "social benefits") without feeling revenue implications. Newcastle- 
under-Lyme Council incurred a debt of £248,133 on acquiring an old 
hospital site ten miles outside the town for assembly and improvement 
for sale in small plots to housing developers from the Master Builders* 
Federation. By catering for small builders, the Council felt it was 
fulfilling a worthwhile function: yet clearly, debts had to be carried 
while piecemeal disposal took place, and the scheme was described as 
"high risk" as it was never certain that a demand would exist for 
houses so far from the town. Officials doubted if the scheme could 
have been considered had the debts needed to be serviced from the 
rates fund. Coventry Council incurred "enormous losses" on improving 
inner city sites for disposal for industrial development which would 
nevertheless "meet the optimum employment needs of the city".
Warwickshire Council found it difficult to resist arguments from its 
Planning Department to clear derelict Birmingham Gas Corporation land 
at Stratford-upon-Avon for private disposal for industrial use, loss- 
making though the scheme was.
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Officials of Warwickshire and Newcastle-under-Lyme Councils 
thought that, in face of the appropriation of such a large proportion 
of surpluses by Central Government, rate-fund isolation formed the 
incentive that was necessary for local authorities to even consider 
dealing under the Community Land Act. The question seems to be, where 
does one draw the line between incentive to deal and lack of incentive 
to deal economically? That debts do not have to be serviced from an 
authority's rates fund in many ways constitutes such a lack of incentive. 
Both Coventry and Charnwood Councils raised this point and it is 
illustrated in the case of South Yorkshire Council which never had 
any intention of bringing its Land Account into surplus as long as it 
was not faced with the necessity of servicing its sizeable deficit 
(Appendix k and Figure l) from its rates fund.
However, with the closing of the Land Accounts and the expiry of 
all loan sanctions on the 31st of March, I98O, this necessity may arise, 
not only for South Yorkshire but for all local authorities whose Land 
Accounts are in deficit. Furthermore, five of the six local authorities 
studied are obliged to, or have chosen to, continue land programmes 
begun under the Community Land Act after this date. Only Warwickshire 
Council intended to dispose of all its community land freehold as 
facilitated by the present Government's General Consent in GNLA 20:
"The restrictions on the disposal of certain material 
interests in land .... are revoked and a new General 
Consent is appended to this Note, which leaves authorities 
free to dispose of freehold or leasehold interests as they 
wish."
(D.o.E., 1979)
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This would leave the Council needing to dispose of 7.01 hectares 
(Appendix 4 and Figure 6). The other Councils were anxious to retain 
interests in their sizeable land holdings (Appendix k and Figures 2,
8 and 10) and were seeking other sources of finance for completion 
of programmes: South Yorkshire from private sources (Merchant Banks 
and pension funds were mentioned); Tyne and Wear from Urban Programme 
funds; Coventry from Locally Determined Sector; Newcastle-under-Lyme 
from indigenous capital and revenue as well as loans from Derelict 
Land Key Sector; and Chamwood also from indigenous capital and revenue.
Division of Surpluses
The third "Key Area" of the Community Land Act's financial 
discipline has been indentified as the division of Land Account surpluses 
and financing of Land Account deficits by Central Government. The 
Community Land Act, it will be remembered, arranged for any surpluses 
to be divided in the ratio of 40 per cent to Central Government; 30 per 
cent to an "Equalisation Fund" for redistribution to those authorities
whose Land Accounts were in deficit; and 30 per cent to be retained
by the generating authorities for use in place of other borrowing 
approvals. Thus a local authority was faced with an effectual 70 per
cent tax on any surplus, but as few were made, it was more likely to
be faced with the possibility of a share-out, however small, from the 
Equalisation Fund.
Amongst the six local authorities of the study, no surpluses were 
made: nonetheless, opinions were strong on the division of any likely 
ones. Only South Yorkshire Council felt that the question was 
irrelevant, as, in the official's own words, the Council "had never 
had a surplus and was never likely to."
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Other authorities felt that the 70 per cent tax was a disincentive 
to run into surplus and thus to operate economically; as was the case 
with the isolation of debts from the rate fund, it encouraged authorities 
to pursue loss-making schemes for "planning gain".
While all of the local authorities for which statistics are 
available received distribution shares from the Equalisation Fund, 
ranging from Tyne and Wear's £387 to South Yorkshire's £^,^59 (Appendix k) 
only the latter Council felt that the shares were of any significance.
Conclusion
Thus experience of the new financial discipline introduced by the 
Community Land Act was mixed: some authorities relished the freedom 
that it gave them, others found it restrictive. Some found it a useful 
extra tool in the implementation of new or existing policies, others 
would have preferred to operate without it. But none were without 
their opinions as to its effectiveness, and while differences exist, 
then so do consistencies and it is to be hoped that these consistencies 
may form the basis for recommendations concerning any future attempts 
to evolve a local authority "Land Scheme".
It has been the intention of this chapter to make some 
generalisations about local authorities' experiences of land dealing 
both before and during the operation of the Community Land Act's 
financial discipline. It remains to draw these generalisations 
together and make recommendations accordingly. This will be attempted 
in subsequent chapters.
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CHAPTER 5
THE DISCIPLINE IN SUMMARY
May it initially be stressed that before any conclusions may be 
drawn from the findings outlined in the preceding chapter, it must be 
remembered that they only apply to the six local authorities studied 
and any broader generalisations rest on the assumption that other 
authorities enjoyed similar experiences. Nonetheless, it is believed, 
as was stated earlier, that the authorities of the study represent a 
wide range of situations and it is to be hoped that recommendations 
based on their experiences may be applicable elsewhere.
Generalisations
In terms of land dealing, it may be reiterated that authorities 
seemed long experienced in this field, and even those recently- 
established authorities such as South Yorkshire and Tyne and Wear 
(which were created on re-organisation in 197^ ) have been involved in 
land dealings for the better parts of their existence.
This involvement in land dealing may be conducted according to 
a Council Policy, as in the cases of Tyne and Wear and Newcastle- 
under Lyme; or, more frequently, it may take the form of an overview 
of the land market to ascertain the availability of land which may 
fulfil a particular need at a particular time. In short, it may be 
policy-led or opportunity-led. In either case, it appears that the 
Community Land Act did not throw local authorities into the dark of 
a whole new policy area: it simply altered the arrangements for proce­
dure in a field which was already well-known to them. Four out of the 
six local authorities of the study did not even expand their land 
dealing activities or alter their policies under the Community Land Act.
- 63 -
"Only the financial arrangements changed," said an official of Tyne and 
Wear Council.
Yet were the new financial arrangements entirely suited to the 
well-established practices of local authority land dealing? It appears 
not. Four out of the six authorities of the study had preferred their 
previous arrangements, be they by borrowing or financing internally.
The Community Land Act's arrangements were best suited to the practices 
of South Yorkshire and Tyne and Wear Councils, which seemed to look on 
them as a form of "grant-aid", providing indefinite-term loans that 
never had to be serviced. Clearly, this was not the way in which the 
Community Land Act was intended to be operated.
The unpopularity of the Community Land Act seemed to be largely 
due to its undesirably high degree of central control. Clearly, where 
Key Sector finance is concerned, control must be centralised to some 
degree: and it is difficult to see a way in which a scheme concerned 
solely with land could not be financed from Key Sector. But central 
control in the case of the Community Land Act was also synonymous with 
delay, inefficiency and complexity and it seemed to be these by-products 
that were held in low esteem by local authorities. While it appeared 
that most were willing to submit to individual site loan sanction 
arrangements in theory, complications such as the expiry of sanctions 
at the end of each year with the closing of the Land Accounts, the 
complexity of application forms and the long delays in obtaining or 
being refused sanctions caused their unpopularity in practice. Similarly, 
while the majority of authorities appreciated the criteria of profit­
ability and rapid disposability that were applied to the granting of 
loan sanctions, the constant changing of these criteria by successive 
GNLA's was resented.
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If loan sanctions by individual site were appreciated at least 
in theory, block sanctions based on Rolling Programmes were not. The 
feeling was largely that they were unrealistic from the point of view 
of both local and Central Government and that the attempts to introduce 
them both initially in 1976 and latterly in early 1979 were misguided. 
Most authorities' land programmes appeared to proceed in terms of 
individual sites as and when they became available, and any land scheme 
should attempt to take heed of this in its administration of finance.
The indication is that the system of individual site loan sanction is 
more suited to local authority land dealing than its apparent alternative.
What, then, of the Land Accounts themselves, which were operated 
on the basis of capitalisation of current expenditure in order that
debts (which were hopefully to be only short-term) could be incurred
without revenue implications and without rates-fund burdens? As has 
been seen, the system rests on the assumption that debts may be recouped 
on the sale of improved land. However, with the apparent stagnation 
of the land markets in such urban jurisdictions as South Yorkshire,
Tyne and Wear and even Coventry, this assumption is unfounded at least 
in the foreseeable future. An official of Coventry Council stated that
as few as 20 per cent of costs of acquisition and improvement of an
inner city plot could hope to be recouped on disposal. Tyne and Wear 
Council's officials expected land deals to move into profit between 
20 and 25 years after acquisition. South Yorkshire Council's officials 
never even looked for profits. The situations are illustrated graph­
ically in the escalating Land Account deficits of Figures 1, 3 and 7» 
which correspond with the accumulation of land shown in Figures 2, k 
and 8. It appears that in these cases, the financial arrangements of 
the Land Accounts were misconceived; the sale of a plot of land would
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not even cover its own acquisition and improvement costs, let alone 
the cumulative interest and management costs arising from its possession.
However, in the cases of Warwickshire, Newcastle-under-Lyme and 
Charnwood, perhaps the same criticisms are not valid. All three 
authorities reported that their Land Accounts would be likely to move 
into surplus in the immediate future (Newcastle's was already there), 
as improved land was sold, leasehold or freehold, or appropriated to 
other accounts. The indication is that where the land market is 
apparently healthy, the Community Land Accounts operated as they were 
intended to and one can only speculate as to what would have been the 
overall financial situation had the Community Land Act been in operation 
for one more year. Even the Land Accounts of 1979-80, when they are 
closed, may show a rather more healthy financial situation than those 
of 1978-79.
Clearly, though, exclusion of all jurisdictions where the land 
market is in stagnation from a particular system of accounting is no 
basis for a future local authority land scheme. The question of 
incentive to run into surplus or stay in deficit would remain unanswered. 
A number of authorities reported that both rate-fund isolation and 
appropriation of large proportions of any likely surpluses by Central 
Government on the one hand removed the incentive to seek profit and 
on the other, gave an incentive to remain in deficit. However healthy 
or stagnant a jurisdiction's land market was, as long as authorities 
found themselves in such a position, the likelihood of Land Accounts 
running into deficit and the Community Land Scheme failing to become 
"self-financing” remained. The lack of incentive to operate economically 
may well have allowed local authorities to pursue loss-making schemes
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for social benefit or "planning gain"; yet this was not the intended 
purpose of the Community Land Scheme. Schemes that are expected to 
make a loss should be covered by grant-aided loans and not form 
priorities under arrangements that are intended to give local 
authorities a land market role.
Yet even those authorities that incurred sizeable deficits and 
were never likely to run into surplus (South Yorkshire, Tyne and Wear: 
in Appendix k and Figures 1 and 3) were anxious to continue their land 
programmes after the expiry of all Community Land Key Sector loan 
sanctions on March 31st, I98O. In some cases, this was due to 
continuing legal or moral obligations, but it is notable that only one 
of the authorities studied intended to dispose of all its community 
land freehold.
It appears that the maxim "As in the beginning, so in the end," 
applies to local authority land dealing: active in the practice before 
the operation of the Community Land Act, and eager to remain so on its 
passing. This is not to say that the switch from one financial discipline 
to another will not present problems: authorities* finance officials 
are busily seeking alternative .sources of finance in the uncertainty 
that prevails over the closing of the Land Accounts and appropriation 
or otherwise of their deficits or surpluses.
"We'll be up to our necks in it," stated an official of South Yorkshire 
Council. But hopefully these problems will be short term and involve­
ment in land dealing will continue.
It has been postulated that the Community Land Act was politically 
unacceptable because it was deemed impractical. It has also been 
postulated that if future years see future Labour Governments, further
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attempts to endow local authorities with a land market role are 
likely. It is to be hoped that, from the generalisations on the 
experience of the Community Land Act's operation, implications can be 
drawn for the practicality and acceptability of these likely further 
attempts.
Implications
Firstly, in its attempts to give local authorities a market role, the 
Community Land Act appears to have largely failed. It has already 
been seen that authorities were not inexperienced in land dealing 
before the operation of the Act and that, rather than expand their 
activities during its operation, they simply adapted them to the new 
financial discipline. Deals that would have been financed from 
indigenous capital and revenue or Locally Determined Sector loans 
were instead financed from Community Land Key Sector loans. Most 
authorities thought that they had perfectly adequate legislative powers 
for involvement in land dealing before the operation of the Community 
Land Act. It is true that the Act was in its infancy, and that the 
intention was for authorities to gradually increase their market 
operations until positions of dominance were reached after the "Second 
Appointed Day"; but the fact that the Act was most popular in juris­
dictions where land markets were stagnant and profits on deals impossible 
seems to indicate that its best use was not concerned with market 
involvement.
In fact, its best use appeared to be as a provision for incurring 
large, unserviced debts o.n loss-making land deals which yielded 
"planning gain"; such as Tyne and Wear's Construction of Advance 
Factory Units and Coventry's assembly of inner city sites. Yet not only
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was it not intended to be operated thus (as illustrated by the fact 
that all grant-aided transactions, which would normally apply to such 
loss-making deals, were kept outside the Land Accounts), the resultant 
deficits were central to the criticisms of "inefficiency" which brought 
about the Act's repeal. This is not to deny the importance of local 
authority involvement in loss-making spheres; indeed, the fact that 
Community Land Finance was used thus perhaps implies that existing 
allocations of grant-aided loans were insufficient. But it is also 
important that a scheme designed to give the local authority in general, 
and the Planner in particular, a degree of involvement in, and control 
over, development land and its market, is used to its true purpose.
If any future land scheme is to be used to such a true purpose, there 
must be no doubt, from the local authorities' point of view, that this 
is where its most rewarding use lies.
This would appear to demand an entirely different system of 
financing to that introduced by the Community Land Act. Authorities 
must be given the incentive to deal economically for them to expand 
their land market activities. Grant-aided loans such as those from 
Urban Programme and Derelict Land Key Sector funds could continue 
to finance acquisition and management of land which needed substantial 
improvement before it even became marketable.
In capitalising all current expenditure and thus removing rate fund 
burdens, the Community Land Act also removed such an incentive to deal 
economically. Furthermore, appropriation of 70 per cent of all Land 
Account surpluses gave authorities an incentive to remain in deficit 
and thus enjoy share-outs from the Equalisation Fund. This is illustrated 
to some degree by the fact that the only local authority that felt its
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Equalisation Fund share-out to be of any significance was the 
authority that incurred the largest Land Account deficit; South 
Yorkshire (Appendix 4), It is true that the Community Land Act came 
at a time of rate increase and that the Government was wary of imposing 
an extra burden on the rates funds; indeed, claims that the scheme 
"would not cost a penny" may have formed a strong political selling 
point. But at least rates fund servicing of Land Account deficits 
would have operated as an inbuilt control on land dealing under the 
Community Land Act. Had they been obliged to operate thus, authorities 
may have been unwilling to incur excessive debts; thus their activities 
may have been directed towards marketable sites; and development land.
In jurisdictions such as South Yorkshire and Tyne and Wear, where by 
all accounts such sites do not exist, use of the Community Land Act 
would have been limited; but in other jurisdictions, its use could 
have proceeded unhindered by the strict central control (and resultant 
inefficiency) that was necessary under the system as it operated. In 
short, while control was necessary, perhaps it should have been 
imposed at the start by way of incentives to deal economically, rather 
than throughout by way of scrutiny of all deals by Central Government.
It is believed that obliging local authorities to service deficits from 
their rates funds would have constituted such an incentive.
So too, then, would enabling authorities to keep their Land Account 
surpluses act as an incentive to run into surplus. Some of the 
authorities studied (Warwickshire, Coventry, Newcastle-under-Lyme) 
expressed the opinion that only in face of rates-fund isolation of 
deficit was the appropriation of 70 per cent of surplus by Central 
Government acceptable. If the former "carrot" is removed, then so
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should the latter "stick" he; if authorities are required to accept 
the financial burdens of land scheme dealing, then so should they be 
allowed to enjoy the financial benefits. Perhaps the only stipulation 
should be that Land Account surpluses must be used to cover further 
expense under the land scheme as more land is acquired, managed and 
improved for disposal.
Yet if any land scheme must proceed on the basis of loan sanctions 
for individual sites (and it appears that such a system is favoured 
by local authorities), for the sake of all concerned, attempts should 
be made to simplify and streamline procedures. The necessity for loan 
sanctions to expire at the end of each financial year seems questionable, 
even if it is convenient for accounting purposes; delays while authorities 
re-apply for sanctions are hardly conducive to continuing programmes 
of acquisition, assembly, improvement and disposal. Even more worrying 
is the prospect of an authority being refused loan sanction to continue 
a half-completed scheme, as was the case with Tyne and Wear. Having 
approved a scheme initially, there should be no need for Central 
Government to re-assess it a year later. However, continuing loan 
sanctions would also require efforts from local authorities to make 
accurate estimates of the total costs of schemes and not just their 
costs within one year. Similarly, once criteria for issue of loan 
sanctions have been established by Central Government, they should be 
adhered to. Constant changes of criteria are damaging not only to the 
operation of land programmes themselves, but to relations between 
Central and Local Government in general. Only two out of the six 
authorities studied reported satisfactory relations with the Department 
of the Environment: the other four seemed to think that there was just 
as much uncertainty in the Department as there was at a local level.
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Yet as has been seen, authorities seemed perfectly willing to respond 
to one set of criteria, however strict. When asked if he could suggest 
a better way of operating the Community Land Act, an official of Coventry 
Council said that he
"wouldn't mind how it was operated - as long as the rules didn't change 
every week."
Many of the changes of rules were in connection with changing economic 
circumstances brought about by such as public expenditure cutbacks and 
inflation. Perhaps the Government had no choice; but if the power to 
choose were shifted to the local authorities by giving them responsibility 
for the financial consequences of their own land dealings, perhaps the 
same observation of strict economic criteria could be achieved without 
rules needing to be imposed from above. The land scheme would become 
a means instead of a centrally-controlled duty.
The setting of "notional" interest rates on Community Land Key 
Sector loans that differed from authorities* Consolidated Loans Funds 
rates also appeared to be a complication of dubious necessity.
Accountants seemed to breathe a collective sigh of relief when, in the 
later stages of the operation of the Community Land Act, they were 
allowed to apply similar rates of interest. Perhaps the Government had 
realised its mistakes perhaps future governments with similar intentions 
will bear the experience in mind.
Finally, to return to the first conclusion, if the Community Land 
Act failed to give local authorities a new land market role, perhaps 
due to its financial discipline being suited to a different form of 
operation, it must not be assumed that authorities are unwilling to take 
such a role. The indication is that schemes begun under the Community
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Land Act, whether or not they would have been considered had the Act 
not operated, will be continued after its passing. And even those 
authorities that preferred to proceed by other methods of financing 
recognised that these methods may not be open to them indefinitely.
Many expressed worry that the soon-to-be-imposed restrictions on local 
authority expenditure of indigenous capital may adversely affect their 
land dealing programmes. Others described Locally Determined Sector 
loan allocations as "minimal" - and likely to shrink further. And 
clearly, land dealing is only one of the functions which compete for 
use of both unspecified loan allocations and internal reserves possessed 
by an authority. Perhaps the continuation of land dealing in accordance 
with authorities' wishes is rather less easy than at first sight appears.
Yet if the wish is there, then the basis is there for a future 
local authority land scheme; the requirements appear to be that it is 
financially viable and that it is suited to its intended purpose of 
enabling local authorities to take up a land market role. Hence the 
two criteria of administrative efficiency and effectiveness of implemen­
tation might be ensured.
It has already been postulated that the current Conservative 
Government is not opposed to the principle of public ownership of 
development land and that it was the Community Land Act's impracticality 
that brought about its repeals perhaps at this stage it should also be 
stressed that neither do Conservative-controlled local authorities 
appear to be opposed to the principles of the Act. Every one of the 
six authorities studied agreed that local authorities should have a 
role in the land market and thought that the Community Land Act was 
basically a very good idea. Even Newcastle-under-Lyme and Coventry
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Councils, which experienced changes of political control during the 
operation of the Act, only suffered short delays in programmes while 
matters were reviewed before momentum continued. The overwhelming 
point is that political opinions did not affect levels of activity 
under the Community Land Act.
Neither then, should political opinions be allowed to remove a 
land scheme that has been proved to be practical. Indications are 
that, through the unsuitability of its financial arrangements to its 
efficient and effective operation, the Community Land Act was not so; 
but on the basis of the lessons learned from its operation, it should 
be possible to make recommendations for the practicality, and 
acceptability, of a future land scheme.
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CHAPTER 6
A NEW LAND SCHEME
To reiterate, it appears that to fulfil the criteria of efficient 
administration and effective implementation necessary for its practicality 
and acceptability, a local authority land scheme needs to be financially 
viable and to be suited to its intended purpose. Its intended purpose 
would be acquisition and disposal of marketable land for private 
development in order that this may accord with the local authority's 
wishes and may accrue financial and other benefits to the community.
It is believed that the means available to an authority for the acquisition
•fef
of land for public use and of dLstposarl land for improvement^are already 
adequate. For the Planner to secure an interest in development land, 
the land scheme must allow authorities to expand their activities in 
the land market itself. It is to be hoped that the aim is not incom­
patible with that of financial viability; and that both may be ensured 
by the arrangements proposed below, which are based on the experiences 
of the operation of the Community Land Act by the six authorities 
studied.
Firstly, in terms of the legislation for a local authority land 
scheme, it appears that few new powers are necessary. The indication 
is that authorities prefer to acquire land by agreement than by 
compulsion. Of the six authorities studied, only Coventry operated 
in the latter way; and only Coventry Council felt that the Community 
Land Act gave significant new legislative powers in that it allowed, 
subject to the consent of the Secretary of State, Compulsory Purchase 
Orders to be made unconditionally on land where the intention was for 
private disposal. But it will be remembered that under the Town and
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Country Planning Act of 1971» an authority is already empowered to 
compulsorily acquire land for comprehensive development or redevelopment 
or
"immediately for a purpose which it is necessary to
achieve in the interests of the proper planning of
an area in which the land is situated."
(Town and Country Planning Act 1971 
S.112 in Karslake, H., 1972)
The Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (1978) points out that the 
Act and D.o.E. Circular 26/77 specify that acquisition must he related
to land required immediately and that perhaps there is a need for wider
powers over land which is not required immediately. Yet would they 
need a whole new Act? As suggested by officials from Coventry Council, 
amendments to the Town and Country Planning Act of 1971 may be found to 
be sufficient and may avoid the need for the drafting and approval of 
another piece of complex legislation. Simple removal of the word 
"immediately" from the above clause may be adequate.
The first proposal is that a future local authority land scheme 
may be based not on a new piece of legislation, but on amendments to 
the Town and Country Planning Act of 1971 which broaden the Compulsory 
Purchase powers of local authorities to cover all land intended for 
private disposal.
A key factor of any such scheme's success, however, is likely to 
be the financial discipline according to which it is conducted. As 
has been stated, legislation may allow, but finance enables, the operation 
of a land scheme and finance is thought to be crucial to both its 
efficiency and its effectiveness.
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Being specifically intended for use in connection with a land 
scheme, finance would need to come from a newly-created Key Sector 
fund. Borrowing from this sector would need ministerial approval: 
loan sanctions for individual schemes, based on detailed forecasts of 
total capital costs over their duration by local authorities, could 
thus form the mechanism for administration of this finance. Loans 
would be repaid at interest rates which tallied with those applying to 
other local authority borrowing through their Consolidated Loans Funds 
or loans pools. Proceeding in this way would give both Central 
Government the opportunity to assess schemes on their own merits prior 
to their commencement, and local authorities freedom to continue 
unhindered once sanction had been obtained.
The second proposal, therefore, is that land scheme capital 
expenditure may be financed from Key Sector borrowing on the basis of 
loan sanctions for total capital costs of individual schemes. Interest 
would be charged at Consolidated Loans Funds rates.
If it was so desired, Central Government would be able to judge 
loan sanction applications on strict grounds of profitability as was the 
case under the Community Land Act| but this should not be necessary. 
Authorities should be encouraged by the financial discipline to concern 
themselves primarily with profitable land deals. Other deals should be 
catered for elsewhere. Controls may be inbuilt from the beginning which 
ensure that this is the case. To allow local authorities to expand 
their activities in the land market, the financial arrangements of a 
land scheme must be geared towards economical operation. While Community 
Land Act-style capitalisation of current expenditure pending future 
repayment of loans on disposal of assets is the method of accounting
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adopted by property companies, with local authorities it is thought to 
constitute a disincentive towards economical operation and to create 
the need for' Central Government to apply profitability criteria to 
loan sanction applications. If, on the other hand, authorities were 
obliged to finance revenue costs from their rates funds, they would 
presumably be less inclined to become involved in loss-making land 
deals. In short, they would concern themselves with acquisition and 
disposal of marketable land.
Even so, it is likely that sizeable debts may be incurred by 
authorities in the initial stages of a land scheme as acquisitions and 
improvements prior to disposal are carried out. They are unlikely to 
be willing to operate a scheme if they are not shielded from these debts 
at least in the short term. After a certain period, however, if that 
land acquired was marketable, its disposal should bring regards and 
remove the need for this. It is proposed that for an interim period, 
current expenditure including interest repayment is capitalised, but 
after this time, deficits are serviced from authorities* rates funds.
As well as being an incentive to bring accounts into surplus quickly 
and not incur excessive rates funds burdens, this measure should 
ensure that the type of land acquired in the first place is marketable. 
Of course, local authorities would be free to pursue loss-making schemes 
if they so wished; as they would be servicing their own debts. But it 
is likely that grant-aided loans, where available, would be preferred 
for the financing of such schemes; as they were so intended.
The length of the interim period during which current expenditure 
is capitalised and authorities do not incur rates funds burdens would 
be a matter for discussion between Central and Local Government. Half 
of the local authorities of the study expected their Community Land
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Accounts to move into surplus shortly; that is, three years after their 
establishment. But some of the schemes pursued by these authorities, 
it has been seen, were loss-making. Perhaps a shorter period of Land 
Account deficit would have been experienced had they been given the 
incentive to pursue profit-making schemes. Given the necessity of a 
land scheme to enjoy its intended mode of operation (which in this case 
would be on the basis of Key Sector loans serviced from authorities* 
rates funds) and hopefully show financial benefits within the term of 
operation of one government, it is proposed that this period be no longer 
than two years.
Thus the third proposal is that, after an interim period of two 
years in which all current expenditure including interest repayment is 
capitalised, local authorities may be required to service Land Account 
deficits from their rates funds.
What then of any Land Account surpluses?Should there be any reason 
to appropriate them for Central Government use or for redistribution? 
Allowing local authorities to keep their own surpluses would seem to be 
the strongest incentive for them to run into surplus; as posed in the 
previous chapter, perhaps the only stipulation should be that they be 
used to acquire more land under the land scheme. The ability to plough 
land receipts on disposal back into further acquisition was one of the 
most popular attributes of local authorities' own capital funds under 
the arrangements that existed prior to the Community Land Act; further­
more, it may be argued that as local authorities would be required to 
service their own land scheme debts, they should also be allowed to 
retain their own surpluses.
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The fourth proposal is that local authorities may be allowed to 
retain Land Account surpluses for further acquisition and management 
expenses under the land scheme.
The final recommendation is that any new land scheme should not 
be imposed as a duty upon local authorities. The means would be 
available for their participation as they saw expedient in the best 
interests of their jurisdiction. It has already been seen that 
authorities wish to continue their Community Land programmes after 
the Act's repeal, even in face of the Government's apparent desire that 
much local authority land be disposed of freehold. There seems to be 
no reason to suspect that authorities would be unwilling to expand 
their dealings in marketable land if the financial discipline was so 
suited; but those authorities that chose not to do so, perhaps because 
they could see no benefits in entering local land markets, should be 
free to exercise their discretion. For the sake of relations between 
Central and Local Government at the very least, participation in any 
land scheme should not be forced; it rather must be induced, by the 
indication that it can provide - worthwhile benefits.
In summary, the proposed arrangements for a future scheme that 
enables local authorities to become involved in dealing with marketable 
land are as follows;
1. It may be based not on a new piece of legislation, but on 
amendments to the Town and Country Planning Act of 1971 which 
broaden the Compulsory Purchase powers of local authorities 
to cover all land intended for private disposal.
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2. Capital expenditure may be financed from Key Sector borrowing 
on the basis of loan sanctions for total capital costs of 
individual schemes. Interest may be charged at Consolidated 
Loans Funds rates.
3. After an interim period of perhaps two years in which all 
current expenditure including interest repayment is capitalised, 
local authorities may be obliged to service any Land Account 
deficits from their rates funds.
k. Local authorities may be allowed to retain Land Account surpluses 
to offset further acquisition and management expenses under the 
land scheme.
The argument has been that not only will this encourage authorities to 
expand their land market activities, but that it will not be open to 
the criticisms of administrative inefficiency and ineffectiveness of 
implementation that are thought to have brought about the unacceptability 
and repeal of the Community Land Act.
Of course, some local authorities may see their land dealing 
functions differently; perhaps as a responsibility to bring despoiled 
land into development; and in these instances a land scheme as proposed 
may enjoy only limited applicability. But it is believed that a land 
scheme cannot cater for all needs, and it would be hoped that availability 
of grant-aided loans may cover those of such authorities as South 
Yorkshire and Tyne and Wear.
In other instances, it would similarly be hoped that authorities 
would use the new source of finance to purchase, compulsorily or by 
agreement, land that is needed for development, with a view to determining
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that it is developed in the best interests of their jurisdictions and 
reaping the benefits of increased market value on disposal.
Clearly, many other factors must be given consideration in 
proposing measures for such an involvement. For example, what would 
determine the prices paid by local authorities for land? Would they 
be allowed to enjoy any benefits such as those provided by the "net 
of Development Land Tax" arrangements under the Community Land Act, or 
should current use value alone form the basis for pricing? Would 
dispossessed landowners be enabled to make compensation claims, and if 
so, on what basis?
The arrangements for local authority land acquisition and possession 
should also be clarified. Should this be according to any plan, or 
rather according to availability and need at any one time? Should 
authorities have purchases in mind before they acquire land, thus 
intervening directly in the market, or should land be held against 
future needs? Should land banks be limited in size, and need there be 
any restrictions on periods for which land is held by authorities?
The basis upon which local authorites conduct their schemes also 
has implications for their internal organisation. Should new adminis­
trative arrangements be made, or should expanded functions of land 
dealing be absorbed in existing Planning, Finance and Estates departments? 
Either way, the common goals under a land scheme may help to break down 
inter-departmental barriers. But who should have the final decision on 
land acquisitions and disposals?
Formulating the terms of disposal may also need some guidance. How 
far should these terms accord with the developer's wishes? Should the
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public at large be given a role in the formulation or is the public 
as represented by the democratically-elected local authority sufficient 
to ensure that development is in the best interests of the community?
Many questions are raised, and it is in no way assumed that 
should a future government attempt to draw up another local authority 
land scheme, they will not be taken into consideration. But it is 
believed that if the financial discipline upon which such a scheme is 
based is sound, then its practicality may be assured and through broad 
appeal, it will enjoy survival at the least. It may even enjoy success.
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CONCLUSION : EXPERIENCE AND THE FUTURE
In the previous chapter, financial arrangements were proposed 
that may hopefully ensure efficient administration and effective 
implementation of a local authority land scheme. Their underlying 
rationale is one of facility and not of obligation; they would 
constitute a means, but not a duty, by which local authorities may 
become involved in dealing with development land. The extent to 
which the means was used would depend upon the authorities themselves; 
when it was considered expedient to acquire land in order to ensure that 
its development accorded with the represented wishes of their rate­
payers, or in order to ensure that a public interest was secured 
in its value increase, authorities would draw out programmes of 
acquisition, management and disposal for submission to Central 
Government. On the basis of the programmes, loan sanctions would 
be issued to cover capital costs. Revenue costs would (after the 
proposed interim period) be paid by the authorities themselves; but 
any profits arising from the land deals would be retained locally 
and used to acquire more land, again subject to central approval.
At the eventual stage, an authority might own a large proportion of 
the developed land in its jurisdiction; conversely, it might prefer 
not to participate in the scheme as it saw no benefits to be gained 
from involvement in the local land market.
Thus under the proposed financial discipline, the role of 
Central Government would be to issue capital finance from a new fund 
on the basis of local authority land programmes. Its control would 
subsequently extend only over interest repayments on the issued 
loans. The role of the local authority would be to apply for loan
sanctions for land programmes, then implement the programmes with 
due consideration to their revenue costs (for which the authority 
would be liable). On their completion, the authority would dispose 
of the land and collect the financial benefits; its control would 
subsequently extend over the development according to terms 
specified in leases and development briefs.
The rationale of the Community Land Act was not one of facility 
but one of obligation; it rested on the assumption that eventually, 
local authorities would be required to take all development land 
into public ownership. Proclaiming itself as the panacea that would 
restore the land to the people, it introduced a whole new financial 
discipline in accordance with its far-reaching aims. Yet its 
financial arrangements appear, in the light of the experience and 
opinions of some of the authorities that had the task of operating 
under them, to have been fundamentally misconceived. By their very 
nature, they gave authorities the incentive to concern themselves 
with loss-making land deals that were nonetheless important for 
other reasons. But the intention of the Scheme was that authorities 
would acquire a public share in development land so that the fruits 
of this development should accord with the wishes of the community. 
The inefficiency and resultant ineffectiveness in this form of 
operation were inbuilt by the Scheme's own arrangements; and 
imposition of strict central control over land deals did not solve 
the basic problem. Successive GNLA's chopped at its branches rather 
than its roots.
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Yet had the arrangements been more suited to the purpose of 
acquiring a public share in development land, would the Community 
Land Act have survived? There are grounds for believing so. Political 
party agreement has been approached on the question of betterment; 
as illustrated by the retention of a high rate of Development Land 
Tax by the present Government. If the Land Act had proved itself 
according to the two criteria proposed herein - of efficient 
administration and effective implementation - perhaps agreement 
would also have been approached over the question of public ownership 
of at least some development land.
It has been argued that, given the centrality of the issue to 
Labour Party policy, a future Labour Government will again attempt 
to take a proportion of development land into public ownership. The 
purpose of the analysis of the Community Land Act and its financial 
arrangements has been to use the experience of operation as a basis 
for recommendations for the practicality, and hopeful acceptability, 
of any future land scheme.
How important is it that a future land scheme survives or even 
materialises at all? Why should not governments reach the conclusion 
that they are more trouble than their successive establishment and 
dismantling warrants? The waste of effort, manpower and resources 
involved in these repeated attempts seems to constitute an argument 
for such a conclusion.
What, then, of the Planning profession? Should the issue be 
dropped, then so too will the opportunity for "positive planning",
promised on the birth of the Profession in 19^7 and attempted to be
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given to some degree on three separate occasions since then.
"Positive planning", brought about through the possession of ownership 
rights as well as development rights, would allow the Planner to see 
his proposals fully implemented through terms in leases and development 
briefs; rather than guided through the existing negative mechanism 
of development control.
Clearly, Conservative Governments could not be expected to take 
kindly to nationalisation of all land, whatever possibilities that 
this might offer to the Planner. Nor would a Labour Government be 
likely to consider such a move possible. But this is some considerable 
way removed from a land scheme that gives existing local authorities 
the means to acquire land for leasehold disposal to private developers; 
as stated above, the authorities would be free to choose whether 
they used the means or not. When they chose to do so, their Planning 
staff would be given new responsibilities in drawing up programmes 
of land acquisition and improvement as well as terms of disposal.
If these were fulfilled to the satisfaction of the authorities, activity 
might be expected to increase. The Planner would stand or fall by 
his own performance in a new sphere. If in the first instance there 
must be an appreciation that a land scheme should give a means and 
not impose a duty, in the next instance, the means best suited to the 
achievement of its objectives must be devised. Perhaps it will be 
along the lines proposed here.
The success of a local authority land scheme, while it may be 
facilitated through provision for efficient and effective financial 
operation, can only be ensured by its use to a worthwhile purpose.
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This study has centred on the formerj responsibility for the latter 
must lie with the local authority in general and the Planner in 
particular. Having secured a public interest in development land 
and its value increases, how should the interest be used? Through 
the drafting of Development Plans, the Planner already has experience 
in determining the type of development which is desirable for his 
local authority's jurisdiction. Ownership of land would give him 
the opportunity to determine that this development actually took 
place.
In the final reckoning, the concept of "Community Land" is a 
dubious one. Any claims that are made for the restoration of land 
to its rightful owner, the people at large, rest only on the 
adequacy of the means employed. Such far-reaching claims demand 
equally far-reaching means; better, perhaps, to make modest and 
substantiated claims and ensure their fulfilment through the provision 
of means thus suited. In this case, the claim would be that the 
proposed land scheme gave local authorities the opportunity to 
become increasingly involved in dealing with development land.
Had the Community Land Act simply made such a claim and had 
its means been more suited to the claim's fulfilment, perhaps it 
would have survived and the Planner would have at least begun to 
fulfil new functions. If acceptability signifies practicality and 
survival is a function of success, then every effort must be made to 
ensure the survival of its successor. Maurice Ash (197#) has stated 
that
"the survival of Planning is the question of the 
implementation of the Community Land Scheme."
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Planning survives; the Community Land Act does not. Only the future 
may reveal whether it died in vain.
approx. 29,000 words 
(including appendices)
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A P P E N D I C E S
I
APPENDIX 1 : COMMUNITY LAND ACCOUNT STATEMENT
STA TEM EN T 1
C O M M  U N IT Y  L A N D  S U R P LU S  A C C O U N T  FO R  T H E  Y E A R  E N D E D
31 M A R C H  19
1. Credits for the year in respect o f:
(a) disposals or contracts for disposals
(b) land not to be disposed of
(c) land becoming grant aided
(d) land appropriated as housing land
(e) land appropriated as slum clearance land
(f) receipts from other authority surpluses
(g) redistribution shares from Secretary o f State
(h) other income from community land (specify)
(i) interest from use of surpluses 
(j) receipts from Inland Revenue 
(k) grants from the Crown
X X
2. Less: Debits for year in respect of:
(a) deficit from previous year’s account X
(b) land acquisitions X
(e) land becoming community land on appropriation
X
(d) debits before disposals X
(e) management expenses X
(0 improvements X
(g) costs of administration X
(h) payments to Inland Revenue X
(i) interest on borrowings X
(j) application of surpluses from other authorities
X
X X
Surplus or deficit on community land surplus account X X
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
STA TEM EN T II
S T A T E M E N T  O F A C C O U N T  AS A T  31 M A R C H  19 O F  
R E D IS T R IB U T IO N  SHARES R E C E IV E D
Redistribution shines received
19 to 19   X
19 to 19   X
etc.
'1 otii l redistr ibution shares received X X  X X
/.c.v.v;
Repaid to Secretary o f  Stale
19 to 19   X
19 to 19   X
etc.
X X  X X
Carried forward for repayment in future years . .  X X
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STA TEM EN T IV
F IN A N C IA L  P O S IT IO N  O F  C O M M U N IT Y  L A N D  A C C O U N T S  A T
31 M A R C H  19
Funds employed
Undis tributed bunds Generated by the Land Accounts
Brought forward from previous year . . . . . .  X
(Statement IV )
Less: Distributed during the year .. . .  . .  . .  X
(Statement I surplus of previous year)
A dd : Redistribution shares received during the year . .  X
Bor row inf’s
Borrowings on items in the accounts . .  X
Less: Advances from land accounts to loans fund . .  X
X X
A dd: Profit (or deduct loss) for the year . .  X
(Statement I I I )
Interest earned during the year on unapplied surpluses . .  X
Curried forward to next year X X
Net borrowings X  X X
X X
Represented by
Community land not yet disposed of (Appendix B) X
Leases on rental (Appendix A ) ..........................................  X
X X
Current debtors X
Less: Current creditors X  X
X X
S T A T E M E N T  V
M E M O R A N D U M  S T A T E M E N T  O F  SU R PLU S O R  D E F IC IT  O N
E S T IM A T E D  C A P IT A L  V A L U E  O F  LEASES O N  A R E N T A L  BASIS
G R A N T E D  D U R IN G  Y E A R  E N D IN G  31 M A R C H  19
Estimated capital value o f leases X
Less: Attributable costs X
Surplus (Deficit) (Appendix A ) X X
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APPENDIX 2 s LOCAL AUTHORITIES STUDIED
South Yorkshire Metropolitan County Council
Major responsibilities?
Structure Plans; Development Control; Passenger Transport;
Fire Brigade and Police; Reserve Housing powers; Highways;
Refuse disposal.
Population at June 1978:
1,304,100
Area in hectares:
156,047
Rateable Value at April 1979:
£131,227,000
Metropolitan Boroughs in the County:
Barnsley, Doncaster, Rotherham, Sheffield (City).
Political composition at May 1979:
Labour, 62; Conservative, 31; Ratepayers/Residents Association, 4 
Liberal, 2; Independent, 1.
Political control since 1975:
Labour.
Government assistance:
Intermediate Assisted Area until July 1979, when Rotherham 
and Mexborough were upgraded to Assisted Areas.
Profile:
Created on re-organisation in 1974, the Metropolitan County 
includes the city of Sheffield and the large towns of Barnsley, 
Doncaster and Rotherham together with many smaller urban centres. 
Its industrial base is one of coal and steel production and 
engineering; glass, textile and clothing manufacture are also
represented. Sixty-seven square miles of the County lie 
within the Peak District National Park.
Land dealings under the Community Land Acts
All of the 106.0^ hectares on hand at March 31st 1979 were 
acquired for industrial development by the Council itself 
on estates at Aldham, Carcroft, Dinnington, Eastwood, 
Goldthorpe, Thorne and Wath West. Substantial improvement 
and development for leasing to industrialists has been 
carried out, but no land has yet been disposed of.
Officials Questioned:
Mr. Morton, Group Technical Officer.
Mr. Keasley, Principal Accountant.
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2. Tyne and Wear Metropolitan County Council
Major responsibilities:
As for South Yorkshire.
Population at June 1978:
1,165,100
Area in hectares:
5 M 5 2
Rateable Value at April 1979*
£121,756,000
Metropolitan Boroughs in the County:
Gateshead, Newcastle-upon-Tyne (City), North Tyneside,
South Tyneside, Sunderland.
Political composition at May 1979•
Labour, 5^ ; Conservative, Liberal, Ratepayers/
Residents Association, 1; Independent Labour, 1.
Political control since 1975*
Labour.
Government assistance:
Assisted Area.
Profile:
Created on re-organisation in 197^# Tyne and Wear Metropolitan 
County takes its name from its two principal rivers, upon 
which centre the two main urban areas of Newcastle-upon-Tyne 
and Sunderland. The smaller towns of Wallsend, Tynemouth, 
Gateshead, Jarrow and South Shields flank the north and south
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banks of the Tyne. The County suffers from the decline of 
many of its traditional heavy industries such as shipbuilding, 
engineering and coal production. Newcastle has been extensively 
redeveloped since the Second World War.
Land dealings under the Community Land Act:
a) 10.38 hectares of derelict land at Pelaw, Gateshead were 
acquired in March 1977 for reclamation, landscaping and 
construction of nursery factories, factory workshops 
and road links prior to disposal to industrialists. The 
land remains on hand; 2.16 hectares were appropriated to 
the Urban Programme Account in 1978-79*
b) Several small sites were acquired for similar industrial 
purposes in August 1978 at Gateshead and Sunderland.
They remain on hand.
Officials Questioned:
Mr. Bainbridge, Group Accountant.
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3. Warwickshire County Council
Major responsibilities:
Structure Plans; Development Control; Passenger Transport; 
Fire Brigade and Police; Reserve Housing powers; Highways; 
Education; Social Services; Libraries; Refuse disposal.
Population at June 1978:
469,500
Area in hectares:
198,069
Rateable Value at April 1979*
£62,678,000
Local authorities in the County:
North Warwickshire, Nuneaton, Rugby, Stratford-on-Avon, 
Warwick.
Political composition at May 1979*
Conservative, 43; Labour, 10; Independent, 2.
Political control since 1975*
Conservative.
Government assistance:
Unassisted Area.
Profile:
The County, whose boundary was redefined to exclude parts 
of the West Midlands conurbation on re-organisation in 197^ > 
includes the historical towns of Warwick and Stratford-on- 
Avon and the industrial centres of Rugby and Nuneaton
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together with the smaller towns of Bedworth, Kenilworth 
and Royal Leamington Spa. Mixed agriculture is predominant 
in the rural south, while coal-mining forms an industrial 
base in the north-east.
Land dealings under the Community Land Act:
a) A 1.95“hectare disused railway depot at Stratford-on-Avon 
was acquired in March 1977. No improvements have been 
carried out and the Council intends to sell the land 
freehold for industrial development.
b) A 1.21-hectare plot of disused Gas Corporation land at 
Stratford-on-Avon was acquired in December 1978. No 
improvements have been carried out and the Council intends 
to sell the land freehold for industrial development.
c) A 3.85-hectare plot of brick company land at Kenilworth 
was acquired in March 1979 when the company folded.
Half of this will be disposed of freehold for industrial 
and residential development, the other half has been 
appropriated from the Land Account for use as a Council 
refuse tip.
Officials Questioned:
Mr. J. F. Eke, Assistant County Treasurer.
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4. Coventry City Council
Major responsibilities:
Local Plans; Development Control; Education; Housing;
Social Services; Libraries; Public Health; Refuse collection.
Population at June 1978:
340,100
Area in hectares:
9,65^
Rateable Value at April 1979*
£43,140,450
County:
West Midlands Metropolitan County.
Political composition at May 1979*
Labour, 31; Conservative, 23«
Political control since 1975*
Labour 1975“77; Conservative 1977-79.
Government assistance:
Unassisted Area.
Profile:
The City, an eastern outlier of the West Midlands conurbation, 
was redeveloped following extensive bomb damage in the Second 
World War. Its industries include motor car and machine tool 
manufacture and its relative freedom from problems of industrial 
decline and unemployment has led to large population increases 
over the past thirty-five years.
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Land dealings under the Community Land Act:
a) 5«05 hectares of agricultural land were acquired in 
March 1977 for disposal for private housing development. 
No improvements have been carried out and the land 
remains vacant in the Council's possession.
b) 0.03 hectares of land in the City were acquired in 
April 1977 for disposal for private housing development. 
No improvements have been carried out and the land 
remains in the Council's possession.
c) Several small plots of land were acquired in 1978-79 
from such owners as the Post Office and Industrial 
Hydraulics for future industrial and commercial 
development. They remain in the Council's possession.
Officials Questioned:
Mr. H. J. Hunt, Assistant City Treasurer.
Mr. M. Colton, Senior Accountant.
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5. Newcastle-under-Lyme Borough Council
Major responsibilities:
Local Plans; Development Control; Housing; Public Health;
Road Maintenance; Refuse collection.
Population at June 1978:
117,700
Area in hectares:
21,109
Rateable Value at April 1979*
£12,602,638
County:
Staffordshire.
Political composition at May 1979*
Labour, 31; Conservative, 21; Independent, 3; Liberal, 1.
Political control since 1975*
Labour 1975“77; Conservative-Independent 1977-79.
Government assistance:
Unassisted, but a Derelict Land Clearance Area.
Profile:
The Borough is situated in the north-west of Staffordshire 
and includes the foothills of the Pennines to the north and 
the edge of the Potteries conurbation to the east. Its chief 
industries are coal mining, brick and tile manufacture and 
electrical engineering. Though largely urban, the Borough is 
fringed with rural agricultural land to the north, west and 
south. It suffers from problems of mining dereliction and
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the Council is active in the reclamation of disused sites.
Land dealings under the Community Land Act:
a) A 30-hectare disused hospital site at Bumtwood, ten 
miles from Newcastle-under-Lyme, was acquired from the 
Area Health Authority in March 1977. After receiving an 
offer of half of its cost price from commercial buyers, 
the Council decided to carry out improvements itself 
and sell the land in small plots to companies from the 
Master Builders' Federation. The hospital buildings 
were demolished, roads and installations were built,
a sewage works was refurbished and the site was divided 
for sale. Since 1977, 20 hectares have been disposed of.
The housing development is in a pleasant setting, surrounded 
by Forestry Commission land, and in an area of very low 
vacancy rates. However, the scheme was high-risk as 
demand for houses so far removed from the town was never 
certain.
b) A 1.58-hectare derelict site in Newcastle-under-Lyme was 
acquired using Derelict Land Key Sector finance and 
appropriated into the Community Land Account of 1977-78. 
After improvements using Community Land funds, half of 
the site was sold in 1978 to an industrial developer at 
a premium on a 125-year lease (after special permission 
had been obtained from the Secretary of State). The 
premium alone covered costs and the scheme is expected 
to make a 30 per cent profit.
The other half of the site was sold at the same time
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to an industrial developer on a 10-year lease with a 
5-year rent review. The rent is held low in return for 
certain restoration work by the developers. The scheme 
does not show a profit now, but will when the rent is 
reviewed. The whole deal is described as "opportunist".
Officials Questioned;
Mr. J. Nixon, Assistant Borough Treasurer.
Mr. S. Powys, Chief Assistant (Development).
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6. Charnwood Borough Council
Major responsibilities:
As for Newcastle-under-Lyme.
Population at June 1978:
130,000
Area in hectares:
69,016
Rateable Value at April 1979*
£17,660,017
County:
Leicestershire.
Political composition at May 1979*
Conservative, 42; Labour, 12; Liberal, 3; Independent, 1.
Political control since 1975*
Conservative.
Government assistance:
Unassisted Area.
Profile:
The Borough's main town is the University and industrial 
centre of Loughborough; population is also concentrated in 
several large industrial villages in the Soar and Wreake 
valleys. Its chief industries are electrical engineering, 
hosiery and chemical manufacture. Much of the Borough is 
attractively rural, with the country parks of Bradgate and
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Wanlip and the County's most renowned beauty spot of 
Chamwood Forest in the west.
Land dealings under the Community Land Act:
10 acres of allotment land in Loughborough were acquired 
before the operation of the Community Land Act and 
appropriated into the Land Account of 1977-78. 
Improvement for disposal for industrial development 
in accordance with the Leicestershire Structure Plan 
was continued using Community Land funds. After the 
change of Government in 1979* 'the Council was offered 
the opportunity of transferring the scheme back to 
its own capital and revenue accounts. The opportunity 
was taken and the scheme continues.
Officials Questioned:
Mr. W. J. Dark, Borough Treasurer.
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APPENDIX 3 : QUESTIONNAIRE
- Ill -
QUESTIONNAIRE
1. Local authority land dealing
a) How did your land dealing activities under the Community Land 
Act compare with those before / those proposed after its 
operation?
b) (if applicable) Why did your land dealing activities change 
under the Community Land Act?
c) Have you followed a policy of land acquisition and disposal 
under the Community Land Act?
d) Did you follow a policy of land acquisition and disposal prior 
to the operation of the Community Land Act? If so, how did
it differ from your policy during the Act's operation?
e) Will your land policy change on the removal of the Community 
Land Act?
f) Are you now disposing of land or do you have further contractural 
or moral obligations to fulfil under the Community Land Act?
g) Would you welcome further powers of land acquisition? If so, 
what form would they take?
2. Loan sanction
a) How did you obtain finance for your land dealings before and 
during the operation of the Community Land Act?
b) How will you obtain finance for future land dealings?
c) Of these financial arrangements, which were preferable and why?
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d) Financially, could there have been a better way of operating 
the Community Land Act?
e) What is your experience and opinion of the loan sanction 
arrangements by individual site?
f) What is your experience and opinion of the criteria of 
profitability and rapid disposability that were applied 
to such sanctions?
g) What is your experience and opinion of the loan sanction 
arrangements by year according to 5~year or 1-year Rolling 
Programmes?
h) What is your experience and opinion of the notional interest 
charges on loans?
i) How did the measures introduced by GNLA's 12, 14 and 19 affect 
your dealings under or your attitudes towards the Community 
Land Act?
3. Operation of Land Accounts
a) Could I see your Land Account Statements for as many years 
as possible?
b) What difficulties, if any, have you experienced with the 
operation of the Community Land Act?
c) What is your experience and opinion of the Community Land 
Act's accounting procedure, which required capitalisation of 
current expenditure?
d) What is your experience and opinion of the isolation of the 
Land Accounts from the rates funds?
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e) What arrangements have you made for the final closure of 
the Land Accounts at the end of this year?
4. Division of Surpluses / Financing of Deficits
a) Were your Land Accounts in deficit or surplus for each of 
the year's of operation?
b) What is your experience and opinion of the effectual 70 per 
cent tax on Land Account surpluses?
c) What is your experience and opinion of the financing of 
deficits from the Equalisation Fund?
5* Miscellaneous
a) How have relations been with the County Council/District 
Councils?
b) How have relations been with the Department of the Environment?
c) What were your Council's political opinions of the Community 
Land Act?
d) Did these affect your level of activity under the Act?
e) What is your own professional and personal opinion of the 
Community Land Act, both as it has operated and as it was 
intended to operate after the Second Appointed Day?
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APPENDIX 4 : COMMUNITY LAND ACCOUNT STA TISTIC S 1 9 7 6 -7 9
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KEY TO CHART
COMMUNITY LAND SURPLUS ACCOUNT
Debits (£) :
1. Deficit from previous year
2. Land acquired or transferred into the Account
3. Improvements
4. Management expenses
5. Cost of administration
6. Net interest charges
7. Redistribution shares to other authorities 
Credits (£) j
8. Land disposed of or transferred out of the Account
9. Redistribution shares from other authorities
10. Other income from Community Land
11. Interest from use of surpluses
12. Receipts from Inland Revenue
13. Grants from Crown
14. Deficit on Community Land Surplus Account
COMMUNITY LAND PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT
15. Loss (profit) in year (£)
LAND ACQUIRED OR TRANSFERRED INTO THE ACCOUNT DURING THE YEAR
16. Area (hectares)
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LAND DISPOSED OF OR TRANSFERRED OUT OF THE ACCOUNT DURING THE YEAR
17. Area (hectares)
18. Deficit (surplus) (£)
19. Housing disposal (hectares)
20. Industry disposal (hectares)
21. Other disposal (hectares)
22. Area transferred out of the Account
LAND ON HAND AT 31 MARCH
23. Area (hectares)
24. Total cost (£)
25. Estimated market value (£)
i
n/a : not available
i
i
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SOUTH YORKSHIRE TYNE AND WEAR
Code 1976-77 1977-78 1978-79 1976-77 1977-78 1978-79
1 24,340 502,314 719,690 5,157 45,605 62,480
2 448,138 6,038 438,308 27,127 42 7,266
3 8,179 204,604 201,213 NIL 5,972 248,297
4 NIL 540 10,895 NIL NIL NIL
5 19,492 27,986 61,584 12,124 6,442 6,275
6 6,670 42,536 69,225 1,197 4,503 10,110
7 NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL
8 NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL 7,405
9 NIL NIL 4,459 NIL NIL 387
10 NIL 150 25,037 NIL NIL NIL
11 NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL
12 NIL NIL 18,269 NIL NIL NIL
13 4,505 64,181 24,530 NIL NIL NIL
14 502,314 719,690 1,428,621 45.605 62,480 326,636
15 47,718 85,138 81,985 NIL NIL (7.405)
16 59.04 NIL 47.00 10.38 NIL 2.16
17 NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL I .65
18 NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL
19 NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL
20 NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL
21 NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL
22 NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL 1.65
23 59.04 59.04 106.04 10.38 10.38 10.89
24 454,596 634,551 1,265,957 27,127 35.735 291,35^
25 454,596 634,551 1,265,957 n/a n/a n/a
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Code 1976-77
WARWICKSHIRE
1977-78 1978-79 1976-77
COVENTRY
1977-78 1978-79
1 6,431 86,752 105,202 n/a 139,789 194,978
2 61,399 NIL 177,938 n/a 2,944 174,418
3 NIL NIL NIL n/a NIL NIL
4 NIL NIL NIL n/a 192 459
5 17,447 13,788 15,098 n/a 19.327 21,866
6 1,564 7,903 11,584 n/a 18,230 28,528
7 NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL
8 NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL
9 NIL NIL 652 NIL NIL 1,208
10 NIL 2,629 2,528 n/a 503 NIL
11 NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL
12 NIL 611 NIL n/a NIL NIL
13 NIL NIL NIL n/a NIL NIL
14 36,752 105,202 306,643 139,789 194,978 419,041
15 NIL 13,319 17,316 n/a 83,152 31,801
16 1.95 NIL 5.06 5.05 0.03 0.95
17 NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL
18 NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL
19 NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL
20 NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL
21 NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL
22 NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL
23 1.95 1.95 7.01 5.05 5.08 6.03
24 76,302 66,431 251,208 98,765 111,826 305,296
25 70,000 150,000 380,500 | n/a 201,500 379.250
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NEWCASTLE-U-LYMB CHARNWOOD
Code 1976-77 1977-78 1978-79 1976-77 1977-78 1978-79
1 n/a 191,428 183,556 n/a 7,144 11,580
2 n/a 56,646 NIL NIL 1,936 35,212
3 n/a 135,175 71,297 NIL NIL NIL
4 n/a 4,548 8,788 NIL 9 U,505
5 n/a 16,498 24,000 n/a 1,646 NIL
6 n/a 19,155 11,288 n/a 845 3,321
7 NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL
8 NIL 217,401 284,085 NIL NIL NIL
9 NIL NIL 1,137 NIL NIL n/a
10 NIL 1,021 4,843 NIL NIL NIL
11 NIL NIL 539 NIL NIL NIL
12 n/a NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL
13 n/a 21,471 NIL NIL NIL NIL
14 191,428 183,556 8,325 7,144 11,580 61,618
15 n/a (50,239) (178,093) n/a n/a n/a
16 31.58 n/a NIL n/a n/a. n/a
17 NIL 16.79 4.89 NIL NIL NIL
18 NIL (120,624) (173,250) NIL NIL NIL
19 NIL 2.73 3.80 NIL NIL NIL
2.0 NIL 1.42 NIL NIL NIL NIL
21 NIL 12.03 1.09 NIL NIL NIL
22 NIL 0.61 NIL NIL NIL NIL
23 31.58 15.39 10.50 NIL n/a n/a.
24 141,288 235,186 248,333 NIL 1,936 35,212
25 n/a 500,000 350,000 NIL 1,936 n/a
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FIGURE 1. LAND ACCOUNT DEFICIT
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2.TYNE AND WEAR
FIGURE 3. LAND ACCOUNT DEFICIT
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5. NEWCASTLE-U-LYME
FIGURE 9. LAND ACCOUNT DEFICIT
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